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 3 
Introduction 
 
1 Background 
1.1 WTO Negotiations 
The issue of the WTO decision-making process became subject to academic and political 
debate after the failure of the third Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999. The 
Conference was intended to launch a new round of negotiations to follow the Uruguay 
Round (1986-1994) that established the WTO, and set the scope and modalities of the 
round. However, the Conference was paralyzed by a fundamental lack of preparation and 
procedures, and proved the imperative of such for the success of WTO negotiations. 
According to a number of developing countries, the General Council Chairman was 
unwilling to properly include the concerns of developing countries in the draft.1 As a result, 
there was no agreed draft text when the conference started. Allegedly, the Conference was 
never formally opened or closed,2 and the fact that the Chairman of the Conference also 
was the main US trade negotiator – Charlene Barshefsky, led to massive criticism from 
developing countries.3 Further, informal consultations which have a long tradition from the 
predecessor GATT, excluded developing country participation, and were dismissed as 
undemocratic.4  
 
The Conference was unable to launch a new round, and the membership could not reach 
agreement on a Ministerial Declaration.5 The preparation process proved unable to respond 
to the concerns of the growing group of developing countries, and there was a north-south 
divide regarding the agenda, in particular inclusion of new issues, e.g. the Clinton 
administration’s labor proposal.6 After the Seattle failure, the Director-General of the WTO 
widely blamed the “medieval” organizational culture.7 Martin Khor, chairman of the G77 
                                                 
1
 WTO Documents WT/GC/W. Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference. 
2
 Raghavan, Chakravarthi: The WTO – an ‘unruly’ rule-based organization? paragraph 10 
3
 Aslam, Abid: Developing countries assail WTO 'dictatorship' , paragraph 2 
4
 Ibid 
5
 WTO Press/160: It is vital to maintain and consolidate what has already been achieved. 
6
 Foreign Policy in Focus: WTO Trade & Labor Standards. Vol. 5 No. 15. 
7
 Lamy, Pascal: Leadership, the EU and the WTO, last paragraph 
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group of developing countries, blamed the non-transparent and undemocratic nature of the 
WTO system, which makes it possible for major powers to manipulate the system, and the 
refusal of many developing countries to continue to be on the receiving end.8 
Recommendations brought forward included formal establishment of the “Green Room” 
informal meetings, and guidelines for procedures at Ministerial Conferences.9 However, a 
large part of the negotiation and decision-making processes of the WTO remain informal.  
 
1.2 The TRIPs Agreement and Access to Pharmaceuticals 
The socioeconomic development of many developing countries is disabled by the burden of 
wide-spread infectious diseases. In 2001, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria claimed 5.7 
million lives.10 Only 10 percent of the people infected with HIV/AIDS in Africa have 
access to treatment.11  
 
There are a number of reasons for the lack of access to medicines. High prices caused by 
the temporary monopoly-situation that patent protection provides, is one of them. The 
Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health states that the TRIPs Agreement “does not 
and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health ..., in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all”.12 Developing countries and NGOs 
criticize the TRIPs Agreement for giving priority to private patent holders over public 
health, and argue that the current mechanisms provided for in the TRIPs Agreement that 
allow members to attend to public health needs are far from sufficient.13  
 
This issue was addressed by the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health of 2001, 
followed up by a temporary waiver14 and a subsequent amendment of the TRIPs 
                                                 
8
 Kohr, Martin: Seattle reports, paragraph 11 
9
 UN: WTO impasse in Seattle Spotlights ineguities of global trading system. 
10
 WHO (2002): Scaling up the Response to Infectious Diseases: A Way Out of Poverty.  
11
 Pan American Health Organization (2005): More Progress on Drug Prices. Paragraph 7. 
12
 WTO Document WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 
13
 Joint NGO Statement on the Special Discussion in the WTO TRIPS Council on Patents and Access to 
Affordable Medicines. Patents and Medicines: The WTO Must Act Now!  
14
 WTO Document WT/L/540 
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Agreement in 2005.15 Developing countries and NGOs claim, however, that the measures 
set out are not operational in accordance with the stated intentions, and inadequate to 
remedy the vast public health problems of the developing world.16  
 
1.3 Main Features of the WTO 
Although it was not on the agenda when the Uruguay Round opened in 1987, the round 
concluded with the establishment of the WTO. Unlike its predecessor GATT, which 
operated on a provisional basis, the WTO has an institutional structure and is a legal 
person.17 The WTO is a member-driven organization; all positions are held by 
representatives from the member-countries, except about 635 administrative positions in 
the secretariat. In comparison, the World Bank has some 10,000 employees.18 The most 
striking difference to the GATT system, however, is the establishment of an effective 
dispute mechanism. Under GATT, the losing party to a dispute could block adoption of the 
decision.19 The judicial and effective enforcement capability of the Dispute Settlement 
Body ensures the legally binding character of the WTO rules and agreements. Many of the 
rules and procedures for negotiations and decision-making are, however, codification of 
GATT practices.20  
 
The main functions of the WTO are to be a forum for continued trade negotiations, to 
administer the huge mass of treaty-law, provide effective rules for multilateral interaction, 
and to resolve trade disputes through the Dispute Settlement Body.21 Other functions are to 
monitor national trade policies of the members, provide technical assistance etc. to 
developing countries, and cooperate with other international organizations.22 
                                                 
15
 WTO Document WT/L/641 
16
 MSF: MSF calls on WTO to refuse ‘paragraph 6’ change. 
17
 Article 8 of the WTO Agreement  
18
 World Bank: About Us 
19
 Article XXIII of GATT 1947  
20
 E.g. decision-making, see Article IX (1)of the WTO Agreement. A general provision on the continuation of 
GATT practices is provided for in Article XVI (1) 
21
 The Dispute Settlement Body is established by the Dispute Settlement Understanding Article 2, Annex 2 to 
the WTO Agreement 
22
 WTO: What is the WTO? 
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At present, the WTO has 149 members,23 which account for about 95 percent of world 
trade.24 The WTO represents fundamental changes in scope and power compared to its 
predecessor. It has an extensive mandate and authority. The multilateral approach requires 
that all agreements apply to all members (except for the plurilateral agreements in Annex 
4). 25 Further, the Single Undertaking approach, which was introduced in the Uruguay 
Round and continued under the WTO, requires all members to accept a package of 
negotiated agreements. It is not possible to commit to some agreements only, or to make 
reservations, which is a very common mechanism in international law: “nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed”. This is in striking contrast to the system that evolved under the 
GATT, which employed the voluntary, plurilateral approach.  
 
Moreover, the issues covered have expanded far beyond traditional trade issues. The main 
endeavor is no longer reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, but covers a variety of 
areas from intellectual property and services, to investment and government procurement. 
The WTO rules and agreements also extend to areas that traditionally have been subject to 
domestic regulation, and limit the policy-options of national law and policy-makers. As a 
consequence, WTO regulation has an impact on health policy, environment, food security 
etc. The WTO has hence a direct impact on societies and citizens, which has resulted in 
increasing public awareness of the organization’s activities. The violent protests at the 
Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999 is an illustration of this tendency.  
 
1.4 Developing Countries in the WTO 
Developing countries form a majority of the WTO Membership (73 percent).26   
The share of developing countries’ trade, however, about 28 percent, has been almost 
unchanged from 1980 to 2000.27 The strong and rule-based Dispute Settlement Body is 
                                                 
23
 WTO: Members and Observers 
24
 WTO (2004): International Business Conference on Global Economic Governance & Challenges of 
Multilateralism, paragraph 3 
25
 Preamble to the WTO Agreement paragraph 4 
26
 WTO: Members and Observers 
27
 The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy (2003) p. 454 
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beneficial to developing countries, in that the outcome of a dispute does not reflect power-
imbalances of the parties to the dispute to the extent that diplomatic solutions tend to. 
 
Developing countries have traditionally pursued economic development through import 
substitution policies.28 The import substitution policies of Latin-American countries in the 
1970’s and 80’s turned out to be highly unsuccessful, and culminated in an economic crisis 
in the 1980’s.29 A number of Asian countries on the other hand, adopted liberal trade 
policies in the same period, and attained a free market success with its rapid adjustment to 
industrial production and open markets.  
 
Distribution of wealth is imperative when engaging in market liberalization. An increase in 
Gross World Product (GWP) does not necessarily entail improved living standards for the 
poor, as the growth caused by trade liberalization often predominately benefits the 
countries with a high level of development. Experiences from trade liberalization have 
shown that the main beneficiaries also among developing countries are predominately the 
largest and most industrialized.30 This also applies domestically: About three-fourths of 
those living in extreme poverty worldwide live in rural areas.31 This part of the population 
usually takes little part in a country’s overall growth.32 This questions the ability of (free) 
trade to work for the poor, and is one of the fundamental criticisms of the current 
multilateral trading system.33 
 
This illustrates the need for careful adaption to a market economy, and awareness of the 
broader implications of such adaption. These are often not sufficiently evaluated before 
obligations on liberalization are committed and far-reaching domestic reforms are set out. 
International institutions governing economic relations to poor countries, the WTO in 
particular, have a tremendous responsibility in this regard. 
                                                 
28
 Policies that subsidize domestic production to avoid importation. 
29
 Narlikar, Amrita (2005): The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction, p. 23 
30
 WTO: Trade liberalization statistics. 
31
 World Bank (2006): World Development Indicators. 
32
 Ibid 
33
 See e.g. Finance & Development: Making Globalization Work for the Poor. Vol. 39, No. 1 
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Developing countries differ greatly in the degree to which their economies are integrated in 
the international trading system; a few large developing countries have attained enormous 
progress and growth, while many still trade in a few primary commodities.34 Market access 
for these commodities is therefore particularly important for their ability to attain economic 
growth.  
 
The dilemma developing countries faced in the Uruguay Round because of the Single 
Undertaking,35 was either to agree to the entire negotiated package, or surrender all 
opportunities gained in the negotiations. Most developing countries accepted it, and 
became full members of the WTO. In return for the inclusion of new issues such as services 
and intellectual property, put on the table by a number of developed nations, developing 
countries were granted inclusion of agriculture and textiles. However, the benefits 
promised developing countries in this bargain have subsequently been claimed to be highly 
illusional, as well as the balance in obligations and benefits between developed and 
developing countries being fundamentally unfair.36  
 
The WTO has been widely criticized for the “one size fits all” approach.37 The statement of 
the Indian delegation to the WTO in the 1950s is often quoted in this relation: “Equality of 
treatment is equitable only among equals. A weakling cannot carry the burden of a giant”.38 
In other words, developing countries claim the necessity of special treatment and non-
reciprocity adapted to their level of development. They claim the right to protect new 
industries that are not yet ready to compete on the international level - the so-called infant 
industry argument, and argue that all developed countries used protective measures in their 
early stages of economic development.39 
                                                 
34
 IMF (2006): Unblocking Trade. 
35
 Requires all members to accept a package of negotiated agreements: “nothing is agreed until everything is 
agreed”, here through the signing of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
36
 Stiglitz, Joseph (2005): Fair Trade for All, pp. 46-47 
37
 UNCTAD (2005): Lessons of Experience: Trade and Development Board Hears that One-Size-Fits-All 
Approach Doesn’t Work. 
38
 Narlikar, Amrita (2005): The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction, p. 29 
39
 Oxfam (2005): Positions in the trade debate, p. 2 
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2 Motivation and Purpose 
The many deadlocks and failures that have characterized the negotiations of the WTO since 
its establishment in 1995 call into question whether the current procedures on negotiations 
and decision-making are adequate. The lack of efficiency of WTO law-making have 
contributed to a proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements that might 
undermine the WTO and the multilateral trade cooperation in the long run. This tendency 
may also work against the poorest countries, as they lack the negotiating power to preserve 
their basic interests or even enter into such arrangements. The unequal bargaining power 
may deepen the gap between developed and developing countries in such arrangements 
compared to cooperation through the WTO.40  
 
Further, many developing countries have been largely unsatisfied with how the 
negotiations are structured in the WTO, e.g. in relation to the Seattle Ministerial 
Conference. This leads to a set of questions: Is WTO negotiations and decision-making de 
facto transparent and predictable? Moreover, does the WTO have democratic legitimacy? 
Identifying key problems of the current rules and practices and possible improvements that 
could make the WTO more democratic, efficient, and fair should hence be addressed.  
 
My main reason for choosing to write about the WTO and developing countries is, in 
addition to the crucial importance of the issues, my plan to pursue a career within the field 
of international affairs and multilateral trade. Writing a thesis on the WTO and developing 
countries is a good starting point. To write the thesis in English was a natural choice, 
considering that all legal sources and available literature are in English, and in addition 
improving my English skills. I hope my limited attainments have not weakened the clarity 
of this paper substantially.  
 
3 Content, Structure and Methodology 
This paper aims to present some of the challenges and difficulties that developing countries 
face in their participation in the multilateral trading system of the WTO. It seeks to identify 
                                                 
40
 These were among the conclusions of the UNESCAP report concerning bilateral proliferation in Asia. See 
2005 Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific (UNESCAP), April 25, 2005 
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the primary reasons for these problems, and put forward suggestions for improvement of 
inadequacies in the current legal framework and practices. 
 
The main research question is: Are developing countries adequately regarded in the WTO 
framework and practices of negotiations and decision-making? The hypothesis is that 
developing countries are not sufficiently regarded in the rules and procedures of the WTO, 
and hence not in specific negotiated agreements.  
 
The paper will therefore first focus on the institutional framework and practices governing 
decision-making and negotiations. It will then analyze how possible shortcomings have 
influenced the TRIPs Agreement and access to medicines to illustrate how the rules and 
procedures for making and amending trade rules can affect a specific area of trade.  
 
The paper is hence divided into two parts:  
The first part on decision-making and negotiations begins with an account of the rules and 
practices governing decision-making in the WTO. It then focuses on the rules and 
principles of the negotiations, and the role of informal consultations and procedures; how 
they might affect the balance of power among the parties to the negotiations, in particular 
between developed and developing countries. Finally, alternatives and improvements to the 
current system are discussed, arguing that an institutional reform is currently not likely to 
gain sufficient support, but that substantial improvements are possible within the existing 
legal framework. The central argument in this part is that there is a lack of rules and 
guidelines governing negotiations which may exacerbate power-imbalances among the 
members, but that some degree of flexibility is necessary to achieve consensus and to 
secure the participation of major traders. 
 
The second part on the TRIPs Agreement and access to medicines begins with an account 
of the rules on patent protection concerning medicines, and exceptions that give members 
the right to waive their obligations on certain terms. Simultaneously, it discusses how these 
rules are interpreted and applied. Then, recent negotiations, reforms and amendments and 
their implications are examined, highlighting the main legal problems de lege lata that may 
limit the possibility for developing countries’ to take public health considerations, due to 
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their TRIPs obligations. This discussion aims to illustrate how the power-imbalances 
described in the first section have influenced the rights and obligations on patent protection 
and access to medicines. It argues that powerful countries with interests in strong 
intellectual property protection may abuse their negotiating power due the flexible 
approach, resulting in disregard for basic public health needs of many developing 
countries, as well as for commitments made in the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public 
Health. 
 
Hence, this paper contains not only discussions on the existing trade rules and how they are 
applied – the de lege lata approach, but also how the rules and practices of the WTO could 
and should be amended to provide a sufficient foundation for future negotiations and 
decision-making – the de lege ferenda approach. 
 
The discussion on negotiations and decision-making focus primarily on procedures in 
Ministerial Conferences, while the processes in the General Council and subordinate WTO 
bodies is left out. Many of the same rules and procedures, however, also apply to these 
bodies. Negotiation-alliances are not discussed due to its characteristics of political science. 
The discussion on the TRIPs Agreement and access to medicines will only focus on the 
rules and procedures that are relevant for access to medicines. Broader implications of the 
intellectual property protection standards set out in the TRIPs Agreement will not be 
addressed. 
 
4 Literature 
The sources used for this thesis are publications by the WTO, as well as by independent 
authors, academics and organizations. The literature is predominately by academic authors, 
but also some from civil society critics and journalists. The WTO website is quite 
comprehensive, including sources of law, minutes of negotiations, reports from the WTO 
and independent organizations etc.  
 
The Journal of International Economic Law has articles on the subject in almost every issue 
of great academic quality which have provided valuable background material on the issues. 
Relevant research papers and other publications by leading academic institutions in the 
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area, such as John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Center for 
Research on Economic Development and Policy Reform at Stanford University, and 
Faculty of Law at Maastricht University, have contributed with ideas on the approach and 
structure of the analysis. 
 
Finally, reports from Inter-Governmental Organizations such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN), and Non-Governmental Organizations 
such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Oxfam, Third World Network, and Consumer 
Project on Technology (CPTech) have provided both statistical material and legal analysis 
of great value. In addition, the NGOs often provide a more critical view than the WTO 
itself, and have been used to create a balanced picture of the issues at hand.  
  
5 Clarifications 
5.1 The Perspective of this Thesis 
As this is a master thesis in law, the perspective is primarily legal. However, a distinctive 
side of the WTO law is that it is intimately associated with economics and political 
economy. The analysis will not solely address the legal dimensions of the WTO, but also 
political and economic aspects and implications will be discussed. It aims, however, to 
address the mentioned aspects separately.  
 
5.2 The term “developing countries” 
The term “developing countries” is vague, and is used differently depending on the context. 
The term is not defined in any WTO Agreement, nor by the UN. There is a lack of 
consensus both internationally and within the WTO to the terms on which a country is to be 
considered a “developing country”.41 Developing country status is hence not given 
automatically, but has to be claimed. It is often a matter of negotiation between the claimer 
and countries affected. At the end of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, the US and the 
EU declared that they would not consider certain countries developing countries.42  
 
                                                 
41
 WTO: Who are the developing countries in the WTO? 
42
 Wikipedia: Developing countries 
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Least developed countries (LDCs) are a sub-group of developing countries defined by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).43 The LDCs are 
countries that meet the following three criteria: (1) Low income (the gross national income 
(GNI) per capita is less than $750 for addition to the list, above $900 for graduation); (2) 
Weak human assets; and (3) Economic vulnerability.44 The list of LDCs currently contains 
50 countries.45 
 
6 Sources of Law 
Here follows a brief account of the primary sources of law in WTO law, and the main legal 
foundation for the analysis of this thesis.  
 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) Article 38 is generally 
recognized as a definitive statement of the sources of international law.46 The principles of 
Article 38 are hence not limited to how the ICJ uses the sources of law in dispute 
resolution, but has validity in most disciplines of international law, including the law of the 
WTO. There is no equivalent to the ICJ Article 38 in any WTO agreement, but the 
principles are brought into WTO law by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU): 
Article 3 (2) provides that the purpose of dispute settlement is to clarify the provisions of 
the WTO Agreements “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law”. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is largely a codification 
of customary international law, and its rules and principles are hence valid in WTO law. 
 
6.1 The Covered Agreements 
In accordance with the Vienna Convention Article 31 (2) and Article 38 (1)(a) of the ICJ 
Statute, the fundamental source of law in the WTO is the text of the WTO agreements. This 
is also provided for in Article 7 of the DSU, which states that the panels shall “examine, in 
                                                 
43
 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was established in 1964, and promotes 
integration of developing countries into the world economy, e.g. by providing technical assistance to 
developing countries. 
44
 UNCTAD: UN recognition of the LDCs. 
45
 UNCTAD: UN list of LDCs after the 2003 triennial review.  
46
 Wikipedia: Sources of International Law.  
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the light of the relevant provisions in [the covered agreements cited by the parties to the 
dispute] the matter referred to the DSB” and to “address the relevant provisions in any 
covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute”. The WTO Agreement 
is an umbrella agreement: Article 7 of the DSU refers to “covered agreements”, which 
means all agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement.  
 
6.2 Panel Reports 
After the WTO agreements, reports of GATT panels, WTO panels, and the Appellate Body 
are the second most important source of law. The system of precedent of the ICJ is 
duplicated in the WTO.47 According to the ICJ Statute Article 38 (1)(d), judicial decisions 
are a subsidiary source of law. In addition, Article 59 confines the binding force of 
decisions of the Court in subsequent cases: “The decision of the Court has no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” The purpose of this 
provision is to clarify the distance to the system of precedent in Anglo-American law. The 
Court is hence not legally obligated to follow prior decisions, but can and should consider 
them. The ICJ rarely departs from previous decisions. Adopted DSB reports often have a 
strong persuasive power: They are not binding precedent, but are assumed to be followed in 
subsequent cases. 
 
Unadopted panel reports are relevant, but have less weight than adopted reports. In the case 
of Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel Report that 
unadopted panel reports “have no legal status in the GATT or WTO system” but that “a 
panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted panel report 
that it considered to be relevant”.48  
 
6.3 Other Sources 
All subparagraphs of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention and Article 38 (1) ICJ 
Statute outline potentially relevant sources in WTO law. In addition to the covered 
agreements and dispute settlement reports, this includes among others the teachings of 
                                                 
47
 The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy (2003), p. 56 
48
 Japan - Alcoholic Beverages, AB-1996-2, Section E 
 15 
highly qualified publicists, general principles of law, and other international instruments. 
These sources are sometimes referred to in WTO dispute settlement.  
 
6.4 The Primary Legal Foundation for this Thesis 
The legal core for the discussion on decision-making is Articles IX and X of the WTO 
Agreement. The procedures of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council have 
customary practices that deviate from the written rules. Further, the Rules of Procedure 
established by the General Council, and the Ministerial Declarations for each Round and 
Conference outline rules and principles that govern negotiations and decision-making. 
 
The legal starting point regarding patent protection is the TRIPs Agreement Articles 27 
through 34. The legal core regarding access to medicines is the exceptions provided for in 
Article 31. A number of panel reports and Appellate Body reports address issues relevant to 
patent protection on pharmaceuticals. A key decision is Canada – Pharmaceutical patents.49 
The Doha Declaration provides an interpretive baseline for the interpretation of the 
provisions on patent protection in relation to access to medicines. Further, the temporary 
waiver adopted in 2003 affect the members’ rights to waive TRIPs obligations on patent 
protection.50 Finally, the amendment adopted on December 6, 200551 amends Article 31 of 
the TRIPs Agreement, and will replace the 2003 waiver when acceptance by the 
membership in accordance with Article X (3) of the WTO Agreement is achieved. 
                                                 
49
 WTO Document WT/DS114 
50
 WTO Document WT/L/540 
51
 WTO Document WT/L/641 
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1 Decision-Making and Negotiations in the WTO 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Legal systems consist of three main processes: (1) law-making, (2) dispute settlement 
based upon the law, and (3) enforcement of the dispute settlement decisions. In national 
legal systems, the government has supreme authority to exercise power within its territory, 
and law-making, dispute settlement and enforcement are hence usually provided for with 
quite effective mechanisms. In an international context, these processes are difficult due to 
the principle of sovereignty. International law-making is confined to the willingness of 
sovereign nation states to bind their exclusive authority. International rule-making is hence 
generally less effective than domestic. Binding dispute settlement and enforcement in 
international law can only be exercised to the extent the states have committed themselves 
to binding arbitration. Far-reaching reservations are therefore common. 
 
An example is the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). According to 
Article 93 of the UN Charter, all members of the UN are automatically parties to the 
Statute of the ICJ. Being party to the Statute, however, does not give the court jurisdiction 
in relation to those countries. The jurisdiction is based on consent, with four types of 
jurisdiction outlined in Article 36 of the Statute. The USA withdrew from the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the court in 1986.52 The Court’s jurisdiction is hence accepted on a case by 
case basis in disputes involving the US. If the parties in a dispute have accepted the court’s 
juristiction, and fail “to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment 
rendered by the Court”, the Security Council may be called upon to "make 
recommendations or decide upon measures" if the Security Council considers such actions 
necessary [Article 94 of the UN Charter]. However, the Security Council has shown 
                                                 
52
 Wikipedia: International Court of Justice. 
 17 
unwillingness to enforce the Court’s decisions, e.g. in Nicaragua vs. the United States. The 
US withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the court the same year as the judgement. 
 
The making and enforcement of international law is hence dominated by politics and 
diplomacy, and is largely cumbersome and ineffective. Ambiguity, far-reaching 
reservations, and weak enforcement mechanisms legitimize the question of whether the 
term “hard law” is appropriate. 
 
The WTO largely departs from these characteristics. The WTO is characterized by legalism 
through its dispute settlement mechanism, and is hence largely different than its 
predecessor GATT. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO has exclusive53 and 
compulsory54 jurisdiction, which strengthens the predictability and legally binding nature 
of WTO agreements. Further, if the losing party fails to comply with a decision, 
enforcement through cross-issue retaliation is provided for.55 Economic sanctions can be 
set out to punish violators in other sectors of trade than the one subject to the dispute, 
which facilitate compliance. The DSB is unique and uncomparable to other international 
dispute settlement systems, and, in this area, WTO law is a contribution to public 
international law. 
 
However, the political processes of the WTO are largely informal and GATT-derived, and 
fit the above description of international law. Under the GATT, with its provisional nature, 
limited membership, and occupation largely limited to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
these customary processes worked quite well. The needs and challenges of the WTO in 
terms of law and policy-making are quite different. The membership ranges from the 
poorest LDCs to advanced western economies, and the interests are hence extremely 
diverse. Further, the issues addressed through the WTO range from agriculture to 
intellectual property and government procurement.  
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The increasing diversity in membership, complexities in issues, and the legally binding 
character of the obligations have not been accompanied by development of appropriate 
decision-making and negotiation procedures. This effectively restrains the democratic 
legitimacy and efficiency of the WTO. The political processes of the WTO are hence not 
adapted to the vast changes of the multilateral trading system since GATT. As commented 
above, the lack of efficiency also leads to a proliferation of non-multilateral trade 
cooperation that could further disadvantage developing countries.56 The gap in 
effectiveness and legitimacy between the political processes and the judicial dispute 
settlement system creates an imbalance that should be addressed.  
 
The first part of the chapter focuses on the rules on decision-making, while the second 
addresses the negotiation principles and procedures. Further, informal consultations, 
including the so-called “Green Room” meetings that are used to achieve consensus, and the 
power-implications of such informal processes are discussed. Finally, alternatives and 
improvements to the current system are addressed. 
 
 
1.2 Decision-Making in the WTO 
Decision-making relates to how a decision is arrived at in Ministerial Conferences, in the 
General Council, and subordinate bodies and the dispute settlement system. Although the 
main focus in this thesis is the decision-making procedures of the Ministerial Conference, 
the same rules and procedures largely apply also to other WTO bodies.  
 
1.2.1 The Decision-Making Bodies 
The Ministerial Conference is the supreme authority of the WTO, and the topmost 
decision-making body.57 It meets biennially – “at least once every two years” [Article IV 
(1) of the WTO Agreement], gathering trade-ministers from all member countries.  
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Everyday operations are conducted by the General Council. It is the highest decision-
making body after the Ministerial Conference. It shall consist of representatives of all the 
member countries, and meets “as appropriate” [Article IV (2)], in practice approximately 
once a month. Between the Ministerial Conferences, its functions shall be conducted by the 
General Council, and carry out the functions assigned to it in the WTO Agreement [Article 
IV (2)]. This includes among others cooperation with other intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) [Article V], and budget 
approval [Article VII (1)].  
 
The General Council also meets as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) [Article IV (3)], 
and the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) [Article IV (4)]. The Dispute Settlement Body 
decides the outcome of disputes on the recommendation of a dispute panel or, if appealed, 
the Appellate Body. According to Annex 3 paragraph C(ii) of the WTO Agreement, the 
TPRB shall carry out periodic assessment of the trade policies and practices of the member 
countries.  
 
The head of the General Council is the Director-General, who is responsible for 
supervising the administrative functions of the WTO [Article VI]. It is a powerful position: 
The Director-General is central as agenda-setter and mediator in negotiations. The 
importance of this position was illustrated by the leadership struggle at the Seattle 
Ministerial Conference in 1999.58 
 
The WTO Agreement establishes three Councils: Council for Trade in Goods, Council for 
Trade in Services, and Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
[Article IV (5)]. These Councils shall oversee the functioning of related agreements, and 
have the authority to establish committees and subsidiary bodies as required [Article IV 
(6)]. In accordance with Article IV (7), the Ministerial Conference has also established 
Committees. 
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The three levels of decision-making bodies in the WTO: 
 
Ministerial Conference 
  | 
Dispute Settlement Body ------ General Council   -------- Trade Policy Review Body  
Panels       |    
Appellate Body     |   
       |     
Committees       Council for Goods       Council for IP    Council for Services 
Working parties    Committees       Committees 
Working groups         Working parties 
 
Source: WTO 
 
1.2.2 The Principle of Consensus Decision-Making 
It is important to distinguish consensus from unanimity. Unanimity means complete 
agreement by everyone. Consensus decision-making does not only imply the agreement of 
the participants, but also relates to the process of reaching such agreement.59 The consensus 
process involves addressing key concerns, also those of the minorities, as each member in 
principle has veto power. This results in greater consideration of the objections of the 
oppositional parties than what is normally the case in voting, where the concerns of the 
outvoted parties do not have to be considered. However, unless the minority has any 
serious objections to the proposal, it will normally not block the decision.  
 
Consensus decision-making may lead to group polarization, which implies that group 
discussions may lead some members to engage in a position further away from the 
collective compromise.60 This could entail a greater risk of not being able to achieve 
consensus, or that the compromise-balance in the decision is decentralized. 
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Consensus decision-making is generally regarded as having greater democratic legitimacy 
than majority decisions.61 Nevertheless, the democratic abilities of consensus largely 
depend on how the process is regulated and governed.  
 
The consensus process can be ineffective, as a small fraction or even one member of the 
decision-making group dissenting, may block a decision. The generally least conciliating 
members may as a result be able to achieve compromises that are closer to their wishes, 
especially if the importance or potential gains of reaching a decision are high. This is the 
negative and undemocratic side of the consensus model. To which degree such blocking 
and compromise-displacement is possible, depends on differences in power of the parties 
involved and how the process is governed. 
 
The consensus process is naturally very time-consuming, in particular if there are many 
parties with different interests involved, which necessitate the negotiation of far-reaching 
compromises. 
 
1.2.3 Rules on Decision-Making in the WTO 
The rules on decision-making are provided for in Articles IX and X of the WTO 
Agreement. The procedures and customary practices that evolved under GATT 1947 are 
largely continued in the WTO.62 Article IX (1) of the WTO Agreement provides that “[t]he 
WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 
1947”. The decision-making in the WTO is hence dominated by the practice of consensus. 
A decision is arrived at when “no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is 
taken, formally objects to the proposed decision” [Footnote 1 of the WTO Agreement]. 
Members not in favor of the proposed decision must hence file a formal objection at the 
time of the consensus decision to withhold it.  
 
                                                 
61
 See e.g. P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization p. 148, and the 
Sutherland Report p. 63 
62
 Article XVI (1) of the WTO Agreement 
 22 
Note that only objections from members present in the decision-making meeting can block 
the decision. This is one of the important distinctions to unanimity, as unanimity requires 
consent from all members. Unanimity is required for amendment of some core WTO 
provisions, see below. 
 
Consensus is not the only way of reaching a decision, according to the WTO Agreement: 
“Where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided 
by voting” [Article IX (1)]. The normal procedure for decisions by voting at Ministerial 
Conferences and in the General Council is simple majority of the votes cast, with one vote 
per member [Article IX (1)]. This is unless otherwise is provided in the WTO Agreement 
or any specific relevant agreement.  
 
Exceptions from the simple majority rule are provided for important decisions such as 
waivers, where three fourths majority is required if consensus is not reached within 90 days 
[Article IX (3)], and accession, where two-thirds majority of the members is required 
[Article XII (2)]. Procedures for decisions on matters related to requests for waivers or 
accessions to the WTO under Articles IX or XII of the WTO Agreement were adopted by 
the General Council on November 15, 1995.63 
 
Adoption of so-called “authoritative interpretations” in accordance with Article IX (2) does 
not require attempts to reach consensus: Such decisions are taken by a three-fourths 
majority of the members. Note that for these exceptions, the majority is calculated from all 
members, not only the votes cast.  
 
According to the rules on decision-making, if consensus cannot be achieved, voting is 
generally the secondary way of reaching a decision in the Ministerial Conference, the 
General Council, and subordinate WTO bodies. An exception is the procedure of the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), where decisions shall only be reached by consensus, i.e. 
not secondary voting [Article 2 (4)], except when so-called “negative” or “reverse” 
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consensus is provided for. Reverse consensus is provided for key decisions on such as the 
establishment of a panel and adoption of a panel report or Appellate Body report: A 
decision is taken unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish the panel or adopt 
the report [Articles 6 (1), 16 (4) and 17 (4) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding64].  
 
Specific voting rules are set out in the Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial 
Conference and Meetings of the General Council.65 Subordinate bodies of the WTO such 
as councils and committees shall in accordance with Rule 33 of the respective Rules of 
Procedure66 refer the matter to the General Council if decision cannot be reached by 
consensus. 
 
Decision-making rules regarding amendment are provided for in Article X of the WTO 
Agreement. The general rule is; if consensus cannot be reached within 90 days after the 
proposal has been formally tabled at the Ministerial Conference, it shall decide whether to 
submit the amendment for acceptance by two-thirds majority: the two-thirds must ratify the 
amendment for it to become effective. In some cases, consent by all members (unanimity) 
is required for amendment. This applies to amendment of Articles IX and X of the WTO 
Agreement (decision-making and amendment), MFN treatment rules (Article I of 
GATT 1994, Article II (1) of GATS and Article 4 of the TRIPs Agreement) and obligations 
on tariff schedules etc. in Article II of GATT 1994 [Article X (2) of the WTO Agreement].  
 
Until now, no amendments have been made to any multilateral trade agreement in Annex 
1A to the WTO Agreement, which include all WTO agreements except GATS, TRIPS, 
DSU, TPRB and the plurilateral agreements. The first time a core WTO Agreement will be 
amended, is through the December 6 Decision67 (2005) on amendment of the TRIPs 
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Agreement in Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement. This decision amends Article 31 of the 
TRIPs Agreement to allow export of pharmaceuticals produced under a compulsory 
license. See more about this amendment in chapter 2.5.  
 
According to Article X (9) of the WTO Agreement, plurilateral agreements can be added to 
Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement, including it in the WTO body of agreements. The 
decision to adopt such an agreement can exclusively be done by consensus on the 
Ministerial Conference. This rule could make plurilateral agreements difficult to adopt. The 
plurilateral approach implies that countries can choose to agree to new rules and 
agreements on a voluntary basis. All members are hence not required to be parties to the 
agreement such as the system is with the multilateral approach, which implies common 
agreements among all members. The plurilateral practice evolved under GATT, but was 
largely left as a negotiation strategy in the Uruguay Round and subsequent rounds due to 
the Single Undertaking approach and the aim to conclude all agreements multilaterally. 
 
No plurilateral agreements have been added under Article X (9), nor have there been any 
amendments to plurilateral agreements under their respective Articles of amendment. The 
International Bovine Meat Agreement and the International Dairy Agreement, two of the 
four plurilateral agreements in annex 4 of the WTO Agreement, were deleted under Article 
X (9).68 
 
1.2.4 Implications 
As described above, the advantage of the consensus model is that it encourages efforts to 
find the most widely acceptable solution and thereby minimize objection. This is 
particularly important in international law, as all signatories have to ratify new international 
agreements after the adoption in order to be bound. It has to be “expressly recognized by 
the contesting states”, as expressed in the ICJ Statute Article 38 (1)(a). Article 9 (2) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that adoption of a treaty on 
international conference by two-thirds of the states present and voting, unless another rule 
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is decided by the same majority. The consensus model, however, further facilitates the 
ratification process; if decisions on the adoption of new rules were made by majority of 
vote, it would decrease the likelihood that the countries outvoted subsequently will ratify 
the agreement. A consensus decision is hence more likely to be ratified after adoption. This 
is an important function of the consensus practice in the WTO. 
 
The decision-making rules of the WTO are in striking contrast to decision-making 
procedures of comparable inter-governmental institutions such as the World Bank and 
IMF. The decision-making system of these institutions is based on weighted voting. The 
votes are weighted by the financial strength and contributions of the members, a so-called 
“one dollar, one vote” system. The general rule is simple majority of the votes cast [Section 
3 of Article 5 of the IBRD Articles of Agreement]. As of November 1, 2004, the United 
States hold 16.4 percent of the votes in the World Bank.69 Major decisions require 85 
percent of the votes, 70 and the US has consequently in effect veto power in such decisions. 
This system effectively places the control of the institutions in the hands of large 
industrialized countries.  
 
Note that the majority of vote is calculated from the votes cast, and not from all members 
of the WTO. Members not present or not voting will hence not be counted. Also note the 
formulation used in relation to voting: if consensus cannot be achieved, the issue “shall be 
decided by voting”. From a common linguistic understanding, “shall” implies mandatory 
voting if a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus.  
 
The one member, one vote rule set out in Article IX (1) of the WTO Agreement in 
combination with the simple majority requirement in most issues, considerable voting 
power is given developing countries, as they make up almost three-fourths of the WTO 
membership.71 Their votes can in theory influence the agenda and outcome of trade 
negotiations substantially. In practice, however, when consensus cannot be achieved, the 
prescribed secondary voting is not employed. The rules on decision-making in the WTO 
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Agreement are hence interpreted in a manner that consensus is the only way of arriving at a 
decision in the WTO. If consensus can not be achieved, no decision is taken.72 
 
One implication of the exclusive practice of consensus is that developing countries’ power 
in WTO decision-making is restrained, compared to the system set out in the WTO 
Agreement. They are not able to make use of their strength in numbers, and the apparently 
democratic principle of one member, one vote set out in Article IX is hence in most cases 
without actual substance. 
 
The practice of consensus increases the legitimacy of the decision-making process, as the 
minority cannot be outvoted and hence be forced to accept decisions. As mentioned above, 
consensus facilitates ratification. The efficiency of WTO decision-making is, however, 
confined by the practice, as it is very sensitive to deadlocks. Legitimacy and efficiency are 
hence largely opposite considerations where an increase in one may lead to a decrease of 
the other.  
 
Consensus does not necessarily mean that all members are in favor of the decision, only 
that no member finds the decision so unacceptable that they must block it. Having the 
opportunity to use the “veto” does hence not mean that is can be exercised freely and 
without consequences. As the members are not equal in power and influence, they do not 
have the same ability to maintain a veto.73  
 
Although the absence of voting disadvantages developing countries in comparison to the 
model set out in the WTO Agreement, the consensus decision-making model itself does not 
disfavor weak parties. As described above, in principle the consensus process involves 
addressing key concerns of all members due to their possibility of blocking decisions. 
However, the ability of the consensus process to include less powerful members’ interests 
largely depends on how the processes that lead to the consensus decision are governed. The 
processes prior to the decision will hence have to be examined. 
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1.3 Rules, Principles and Procedures in WTO Negotiations 
The globalization of trade creates a need for international law-making. The WTO, as the 
largest and most authoritative international institution governing multilateral trade issues, is 
the natural forum for making and enforcing multilateral trade rules. As pointed out in the 
introduction, the WTO law-making processes are cumbersome, and do not match the 
judicial dispute settlement system. As the range of issues and the binding effect of the rules 
increase within the WTO, so does the demand for predictability. 
 
The processes by which the members discuss, debate, and negotiate issues, are distinct 
from the consensus process to adopt decisions. The negotiation processes by which the 
members arrive at the point where they are asked to adopt a decision, is the subject of this 
chapter. The way in which issues are negotiated is, however, largely influenced by the 
consensus model. 
 
The procedures for negotiations are largely GATT derived. Article 16 (1) of the WTO 
Agreement provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided under this Agreement or the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and 
customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the 
bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947”.  
 
General guidelines governing Ministerial Conferences was established on July 25, 1996, 
the Rules of Procedure. The principles that each round is founded upon are set out in the 
Ministerial Declaration of the Ministerial Conference opening the Round. The GATT/WTO 
Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round74 was adopted on September 20, 1986.75 
Part 1 Section B of the Declaration outlines “General Principles Governing Negotiations”. 
The fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Quatar in 2001 opened the Doha Round of 
negotiations, which is still not concluded. The principles of the Doha negotiations are set 
out in paragraphs 47-52 of the Declaration. 
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The Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) was established by paragraph 46 of the Doha 
Declaration, and operates under the authority of the General Council. According to Article 
46, “[t]he overall conduct of the negotiations shall be supervised by a Trade Negotiations 
Committee”. Further, the TNC “shall establish appropriate negotiating mechanisms as 
required and supervise the progress of the negotiations”. It shall hence establish subsidiary 
bodies to conduct negotiations on specific issues. The Director-General serves as Chairman 
ex officio throughout the negotiations. The Trade Negotiations Committee established two 
new negotiating groups to deal with market access and WTO rules (anti-dumping, 
subsidies, regional trade agreements)  respectively. The other issues are to be negotiated in 
existing Councils and Committees.76 
 
The principles outlined for both the Uruguay Round and the Doha Round are largely 
corresponding. These principles are in short transparency, participation, single undertaking, 
across the table, and special and differential treatment to developing countries. This chapter 
will focus on the principles of the Doha Round and comment on how these have been 
practiced in negotiations. Before discussing these principles, the preparatory process of 
Ministerial Conferences will be outlined. 
 
1.3.1 The Preparatory Process 
As a starting point for negotiations, a draft text is prepared prior to the negotiations.  
Chapter II of the Rules of Procedure outlines rules for the preparation to Ministerial 
Conferences: Rule 3 provides that the provisional agenda for each Conference shall be 
drawn up by the Secretariat in consultation with the Chairperson, and be open to any 
Member to propose items for inclusion in the agenda. Inclusion depends on the agreement 
of the Ministerial Conference. According to Rule 5, each session shall begin with 
consideration and approval of the agenda. 
 
The draft text is important, as it defines the work program and sets the agenda for the 
negotiations. At the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, a draft Ministerial Declaration 
                                                 
76
 WTO Document TN/C/W/1 
 29 
was not agreed upon in the beginning of the Ministerial. This was caused by unwillingness 
of the General Council chairman to include items proposed by a number of developing 
countries.77  
 
The original mandate of the Doha Round has been amended on the Ministerials in Cancun 
(2003), Geneva (2004), and Hong Kong (2005) in accordance with Rule 6 of the Rules of 
Procedure.78 
 
In the preparation process to the Cancun negotiations in 2003, the General Council 
Chairman Carlos Perez del Castillo and Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi submitted 
their own draft Cancún Ministerial text79 to the ministers on August 31, 2003,  “on the 
responsibility of the Chairman of the General Council in close co-operation with the 
Director-General”.80 In the cover letter,81 they emphasized that it had not been agreed and 
that it is “without prejudice to any delegation's position on any issue”, but that they believe 
it “constitutes an adequate and manageable basis for discussion”.  
 
New attempts to launch negotiations on the contentious “Singapore Issues” were set out in 
the proposed text despite continued opposition from 70 developing countries.82 The 
Singapore issues include investment protection, competition policy, trade facilitation and 
transparency in government procurement. A decision on the paragraph 6 issue of the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health was “welcome”, according to paragraph 3 of the 
text. There is however no elaboration on the solution, despite that the 2002 deadline passed 
in deadlock. See more about the solution on this issue in chapter 2.5. NGOs argued that on 
the basis of this text, any step “forward” in Cancun would be a setback for developing 
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countries.83 The Cancun Ministerial Conference ended in deadlock on September 14, 2003 
largely due to lack of consensus on the Singapore issues.84  
 
This case clearly illustrates that informal procedures can damage the WTOs ability to 
function, and its internal and external credibility. It also illustrates the importance of an 
agreed draft Ministerial text that includes the proposals of the members, and not least the 
importance of WTO members and the staff in particular, to follow the rules that are 
established. At a General Council meeting in July 2002, procedural guidelines governing 
the preparatory processes of Ministerial Conferences were discussed.85 See more about this 
discussion in chapter 1.6.4.  
 
1.3.2 Transparency 
Transparency is a basic democratic feature, and relates to the freedom of information. It 
implies openness, communication, and accountability, including participation in political 
processes through meetings open to press and public, and public access to government 
documents.86 Information about public processes and decisions should be openly and freely 
available in order to prevent authorities from abusing the established system by e.g. taking 
illegitimate considerations. Transparency implies a two-way communication, where media 
and the public have access to meetings, information and documents from processes, and 
mechanisms for people and interest groups to share their view with the decision-makers 
and thereby have the possibility of influencing the processes and decisions.  
 
Transparency has two important dimensions: internal and external transparency. In the 
WTO, internal transparency relates to access to information, negotiations and decision-
making by all member countries, while external transparency concerns the access of 
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citizens and civil society groups to obtain information about WTO procedures and 
decisions and participate in its processes. 
 
Paragraph 10 of the Doha Declaration confirms the “collective responsibility to ensure 
internal transparency” and “making the WTO's operations more transparent, including 
through more effective and prompt dissemination of information, and to improve dialogue 
with the public.” 87 Further, paragraph 49 states that “[t]he negotiations shall be conducted 
in a transparent manner among participants, in order to facilitate the effective participation 
of all. They shall be conducted with a view to ensuring benefits to all participants and to 
achieving an overall balance in the outcome of the negotiations.” 
 
The Declaration sets out a principle of internal transparency and participation directed to 
the member countries: they shall have the information necessary to participate fully in 
WTO negotiations. The internal transparency of the WTO relates to both the ability of the 
member country governments to obtain information about meetings and processes (whether 
they participate or not), and the access and invitation to consultations, negotiations and 
decisions.  
 
Internal transparency is imperative for the parliamentary control within the WTO and 
within its member governments. Further, national parliamentary scrutiny is important for 
the ability of the member governments to be fully informed when deciding on national 
policies and positions in WTO negotiations. It is imperative for the ability of the member 
states to control the political governance and judicial activity of the Organization. 
Interaction with member state parliamentarians is therefore crucial for the legitimacy of the 
WTO. It also prevents the WTO from being a “closed forum of diplomacy”.  
 
In national democratic legal systems, public access to documents is central. Sweden 
established constitutional rights for freedom of information as early as 1766, which 
specifically provides for access to government information.88 In the Norwegian Public 
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Access to Documents in the Public Administration Act of June 19, 1970 No. 69, documents 
of the public administration are public to the extent that no exception is made by or 
pursuant to the statute. A common procedure to facilitate transparency in law-making 
processes is to submit proposals of new laws or amendment of existing laws for review to 
the different interest groups in the society.  
 
Under Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement, “the General Council may make appropriate 
arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations 
concerned with matters related to those of the WTO”. Chapter X of the Rules of Procedure 
sets out the baseline of the external transparency of WTO negotiations: “[t]he meetings of 
the Ministerial Conference shall ordinarily be held in private. It may be decided that a 
particular meeting or meetings should be held in public” [Rule 32]. “After a private 
meeting has been held, the Chairperson may issue a communiqué to the Press” [Rule 33].  
Participation of NGOs or civil society groups in negotiations is hence only permitted on the 
basis of decisions to do so.  
 
Member countries, NGOs, and civil society groups have demanded enhanced transparency 
in the processes of the WTO.89 There is, however, a reluctance to change the current 
system. Most members agree that the transparency should be enhanced, but there is no 
consensus on the scope and measures to be set out. A common disagreement in the debate 
of external transparency is who should be responsible for the increase of external 
transparency and public awareness of the WTO’s activities – the WTO secretariat, or the 
members themselves. One could argue that the WTO has a limited budget (which is also 
one of the main points in the Sutherland Report),90 and should rather devote their time to 
the already extensive tasks they are set out to perform. The member governments 
themselves should hence be responsible for disseminating information and documents from 
the WTO processes to their respective populations.  
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If the members were to take upon this task, then each member would have to establish their 
own mechanisms. This approach would make it up to each member to establish 
transparency mechanisms, and the cumbersome process of reaching consensus on these 
issues would be avoided. Each member could hence establish mechanisms in accordance 
with their own needs and wishes. The danger is, however, that the current situation largely 
remains status quo. If the WTO shall appear and function as a legitimate institution actively 
regarding democratic issues, the WTO itself should establish transparency mechanisms.  
 
After pressure from members and NGOs and members, a number of NGOs are now 
allowed to attend Ministerial Conferences upon request and registration. On the Hong 
Kong Ministerial in 2005, about 1000 NGOs were eligible to attend.91 NGOs have, 
however, no rights to attend meeting or get their views or working papers considered – so-
called “amicus curiae” briefs. A common argument of some WTO officials and members is 
that “NGOs should work through their capitals”.92 The influence through national 
governments is, however, dependant on the internal transparency of the WTO.  
 
If NGOs were allowed more participation in the WTO, it could be an important 
information-channel to national governments and citizens. Monitoring and information 
diffusion is an important role that NGOs can play for the transparency and legitimacy of 
the WTO. It facilitates awareness and understanding of WTO issues among domestic law-
makers, and can hence also ameliorate the internal transparency of the WTO. There is 
hence a clear reciprocal influence among the internal and external transparency of the 
WTO. 
 
The external transparency of the WTO was addressed already at the Singapore Ministerial 
Conference in 1996, and was added to the agenda in paragraph 6 by “renewing” the 
commitments to “the maximum possible level of transparency”.93 Guidelines for 
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Arrangement on Relations with NGOs were adopted by the General Council.94 According 
to these guidelines, information about WTO activities and access to documents should be 
made available online [paragraph 3], and closer and direct contact between the WTO and 
NGOs should be set out [paragraphs 4 and 6]. Subsequently, significant improvements to 
the WTO website, primarily for external transparency purposes, enhanced both the internal 
and external transparency of the WTO.  
 
A decision of the General Council on Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of 
WTO Documents set out periods of circulation and de-restriction of documents.95 WTO 
bodies can restrict documents they issue, while members can request such restriction. Some 
30 percent of WTO documents were restricted under these rules.96 At a General Council 
meeting in May 2002, members agreed on new procedures for circulation and de-restriction 
of WTO documents.97 When a delegation requests restriction of a WTO document, the de-
restriction period is reduced from approximately eight months to between six and eight 
weeks. The new procedures also reduce the list of documents that can be subject to 
restriction.  
 
The Sutherland Report98 has a separate chapter on transparency and dialog with civil 
society. It starts out by identifying a wide misrepresentation in civil society discussions 
regarding the role of the WTO in globalization, and upholds that the members should 
themselves have most of the responsibility of developing relationships with civil society.99 
The report further focuses on economic problems related to such participation and 
transparency, and claims that tight budgets constrain the engagement with civil society. 
The report states, however, that the WTO should keep all options of transparency and 
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dialogue with civil society under regular review, as they are in “the eye of the storm of the 
international development debate”.100  
 
The report focuses on the problems connected to enhanced transparency, budgetary issues 
in particular. Benefits of enhanced transparency are, however, poorly evaluated. The 
traditional view of the WTO as a strictly inter-governmental matter seems to control the 
premises on which the discussion is based upon. The report’s explicit motivation for 
enhanced transparency is rather the wish for less negative attention than the concern of the 
democratic governance of the WTO, which will be important for the institutions ability to 
survive in the long run. Through a more open and transparent WTO, the work and criticism 
of civil society groups would be more nuanced and to the point than what currently seems 
to be the case, and the civil society misrepresentation that is pointed out in the report would 
probably not be so precarious. 
 
NGOs are primarily thought of as organizations working for idealistic causes. However, 
NGOs also include associations for employers and employees, insurance and bank 
associations, associations for industrial businesses, trade coalitions, etc. A special concern 
of developing countries in this regard is that negotiations would be increasingly vulnerable 
to lobbyism if increased transparency and rights to participation for NGOs were set out. 
Some developing countries worry that open meetings could further displace power 
imbalances due to the powerful and resource lobbies and interest groups of developed 
countries, in particular corporate lobbying. These concerns are probably pertinent: At the 
Doha Ministerial Conference, corporate lobbyists outnumbered civil society groups.101 
Corporate lobbying has hence already solidly established its role in WTO negotiations. The 
US has even included corporate representatives in their delegation, both as case specific 
competence, and to ensure that important corporate interests are sufficiently maintained.102 
The strain of powerful and unsatisfied businesses can be particularly troubling in years of 
presidential elections. 
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For the informatory transparency to be effective within the WTO in terms of facilitating 
informed participation and influence by member governments and civil society, reliable 
information about all processes of the WTO must be available real-time. Such transparency 
is prerequisite for the public support, legitimacy, and democratic control of the WTO. 
Citizens and interest groups should be able to stay informed at no cost. This is largely 
provided for by the WTO web-page. The remaining barrier to the external transparency is, 
however, that a number of documents are not available real-time. Timely access should be 
provided for unless weighty concerns are presented for restriction. This should also apply 
to dispute settlement documents.  
 
1.3.3 Participation 
A fundamental quality of democratic institutions is the ability of those subject to its 
authority to participate in decisions affecting them. The increasing scope and complexities 
of the issues addressed in the WTO creates a demand for more competent and larger 
delegations from the members. It creates a need for substantial human and financial 
resources. Richard Blackhurst reported five years ago that there was an average of 46 
formal meetings per week in the WTO.103 The number has probably increased since then. 
In addition are the many informal meetings, which are often imperative for the successful 
conclusion of negotiations. 
 
Article IX of the WTO Agreement provides that “[t]here shall be a Ministerial Conference 
composed of representatives of all the Members”. Paragraph 48 of the Doha Declaration 
provides that “[n]egotiations shall be open to: (i) all members of the WTO; and (ii) States 
and separate customs territories currently in the process of accession and those that inform 
members, at a regular meeting of the General Council, of their intention to negotiate the 
terms of their membership and for whom an accession working party is established. 
Decisions on the outcomes of the negotiations shall be taken only by WTO members.” 
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Several countries do not have equitable representation in WTO negotiations and decision-
making processes due to lack the human and financial resources. This issue is addressed by 
the WTO through financial assistance and capacity building programs in cooperation with 
the World Bank, United Nations and IMF.104 These measures aim at helping developing 
countries to obtain larger and more trained delegations to facilitate active participation of 
developing countries. However, active participation in the complex and resource-
demanding structure of the WTO is not possible for many developing countries. With the 
40-50 meetings held in Geneva each week, they often enter negotiations less prepared than 
their developed country counterparts.  
 
On average, a developing country delegation is less than half the size of a developed 
country delegation.105 In addition, wealthy nations have a substantial support-apparatus that 
surrounds their delegations, including specialists in the various issues that are negotiated, 
trade lawyers, and sometimes even corporate representatives (read: lobbyists). Twenty-
eight countries, of which eighteen LDCs, cannot afford to have permanent delegations to 
Geneva.106 Even a large LDC like Bangladesh has only one permanent representative. The 
number of delegates naturally affects countries’ ability to participate effectively in 
negotiations, and exacerbate the underlying inequalities in negotiating strength due to the 
flexible negotiation-structures. 
 
Informal meetings, which is an important consensus-making feature of WTO negotiations 
and largely affect the ability to participate in negotiations for many members will be 
discussed in chapter 1.4. 
 
1.3.4 Single Undertaking and Cross-Issue Linkage 
In the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), negotiations were conducted on the basis of a voluntary 
approach, and the membership of each agreement hence varied (plurilateral agreements). 
This approach entailed a problem in relation to the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause set 
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out in Article 1 of the GATT 1947. The MFN principle requires concessions made to any 
member extended to all WTO members, and may allow “free-riding” on the liberalization 
of others when applied on limited membership agreements.  
 
The Uruguay Round applied a sector by sector principle in accordance with paragraph 3 of 
the Declaration: “Balanced concessions should be sought within broad trading areas and 
subjects to be negotiated in order to avoid unwarranted cross-sectoral demands.” The 
Round did, however, end up with a single undertaking. This allowed inclusion of new 
issues wanted by a number of developed countries, while developing countries were 
allowed inclusion of agriculture and textiles.  
 
Paragraph 47 of the Doha Ministerial text provides that “[w]ith the exception of the 
improvements and clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the conduct, 
conclusion and entry into force of the outcome of the negotiations shall be treated as parts 
of a single undertaking. However, agreements reached at an early stage may be 
implemented on a provisional or a definitive basis. Early agreements shall be taken into 
account in assessing the overall balance of the negotiations.” 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the single undertaking approach requires all members to 
accept a package of negotiated agreements: “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. 
The single undertaking allows for tradeoffs across issues that otherwise are not related. 
Negotiating agreement across issues facilitates consensus, as members may allow inclusion 
of issues that they otherwise would oppose, in exchange for issues they want included on 
another sector of trade. 
 
At the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003, the negotiations broke down because the 
members could not agree on the approach of the negotiation on agriculture.107 In addition to 
illustrating the importance of agriculture to the members, it shows how important the 
formula for the negotiations is. The way negotiations are organized and the approach to the 
issues are of significance to the result of the negotiations. The influence of the process on 
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the content of the final agreement is called structure-substance pairing, and is a principle 
common to all law.108 Choosing negotiation formula is hence not only a technical or legal 
matter, but most of all a highly political issue, as most matters in the WTO regarding how 
the members shall interact.109 Disagreement on the negotiation formula to be used in the 
agriculture negotations was one of the main reasons for the failure of the Cancun 
Ministerial Conference in 2003. 
 
Cross issue linkage was introduced in the Kennedy Round (1964-1967) to deal with the 
increasing variety of issues and parties in the negotiations. Cross issue linkage relates to the 
process of negotiating compromises across the variety of issues that are to be negotiated in 
the round. This approach enables solutions on sensitive issues, and is generally recognized 
as necessary for the multilateral approach to be continued. If compromises should be 
negotiated issue by issue, the probability of reaching consensus would be minimal. 
Through this method, countries can bargain in accordance with the importance of the issues 
to their national interests.  
 
After across-the-board was adopted in the Kennedy round, a mix and match approach was 
applied in practice.110 In the WTO, the structure for negotiations is defined for each round 
and each issue. The approach can hence be adapted to the challenges that face the members 
on specific issues. The respective preferences of the negotiating countries can be 
exchanged through this approach - a reciprocal exchange through issue-linkage. The trade 
negotiations are hence based on the principle of reciprocity or "trade-offs." That is, one 
country gives a concession in one area, such as the lowering of tariffs for a certain product, 
in return for another country acceding to a certain agreement. This approach is largely 
beneficial to large and diversified economies that can offer a variety of benefits. As 
mentioned in the introduction, many poor countries still trade in a few primary 
commodities, and are hence severely disadvantaged under this approach. However, their 
situation would probably be even more severe if “across the table” was not applied, as they 
would be dependant on other members’ interest in the commodities and sectors which their 
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trade is based upon. For the most part, negotiations and trade-offs take place among the 
developed countries and some of the larger developing countries.111 
 
Illustrations of the “mixed approach” are services and agriculture. Under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) – a request-offer model is set out, where each 
member submits bilateral requests to other members on proposed areas of service 
liberalization. On the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, a plurilateral request 
model was agreed.112 In agriculture, a tiered formula approach is applied through the “July 
Package”, which was agreed on in a post-Cancun General Council meeting.113 This is a 
radical approach that aims to reduce the overall level of trade-distorting domestic support, 
measured through the so-called “Aggregate Measurement of Support” (AMS). Through this 
system, countries with a high level of protection will have to make greater reductions. 
However, all countries can designate sensitive products to which smaller tariff cuts are 
required, and developing countries can designate Special Products in order to take into 
account non-trade concerns such as rural development. 
 
Flexibilities in the negotiation-approach adapted to the political challenges of the issue at 
hand are often necessary to conclude negotiations successfully. However, as other 
flexibilities that facilitate consensus, issue linkage can also be used by powerful nations to 
extract disproportionate concessions from a weaker counterpart.114 The Uruguay round 
makes for a good example: as commented above, developing countries got concessions on 
agriculture and textiles while the tradeoff was inclusion of new issues. The prospected 
benefits of developing countries from the inclusion of agriculture and textiles have 
subsequently been claimed to be illusional,115 while developed countries have established a 
framework for expansion and protection of their services and information industries – also 
in the emerging markets of developing countries.  
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Issue-linkage also extends beyond trade: some developed countries are known for giving 
bilateral carrots through aid, loans, regional trade arrangements etc, or threatening to 
withdraw existing beneficial arrangements in return for withdrawal from a certain position 
or agreeing to a concession.116 Issue-linkage can hence exacerbate power asymmetries 
within the WTO membership, as developing countries sign agreements that do not serve, or 
may even be detrimental to their development objectives. 
 
1.3.5 Special and Differential Treatment 
Special and differential treatment (SDT) was introduced through the so-called “Enabling 
Clause” that was introduced throught the decision of November 28, 1979 on Differential 
and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries.117 The special and differential treatment principle implies that international trade 
rules should be adapted to the particular economic situation of developing countries. The 
principle has two main aspects: (1) With respect to market access commitments, SDT is 
provided for through non-reciprocal trade obligations in order to provide preferential access 
for developing country exports in developed country markets; and (2) With respect to trade 
rules and disciplines, SDT means that developing countries can be exempted from 
obligations to implement particular trade rules, and may be granted longer implementation 
periods and technical assistance for implementation of commitments. All developing 
country members are eligible for SDT. 
 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Preamble of the WTO Agreement provides that the parties’ 
“relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted … in a manner 
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development, Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure 
that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in 
the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic 
development…”. 
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In accordance with this aim, paragraph 50 of the Doha Declaration provides that “[t]he 
negotiations and the other aspects of the Work Programme shall take fully into account the 
principle of special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed countries 
embodied in: Part IV of the GATT 1994; the Decision of November 28, 1979 on 
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries; the Uruguay Round Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-
Developed Countries; and all other relevant WTO provisions.” The actual content of the 
principle in the Doha Round is determined by a number of decisions reached on the various 
issues. 
 
The non-reciprocity principle was introduced in the Tokyo Round through the so-called 
“Enabling Clause”, which is the legal basis for the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP). Under the GSP, developed countries may offer non-reciprocal preferential treatment 
(e.g. through low duties on imports) to products originating in developing countries. When 
developed countries grant trade concessions to developing countries they should not expect 
the developing countries to make matching offers in return – i.e. non-reciprocity. The 
countries that grant preferences determine which countries and products that are eligible for 
special treatment. Non-reciprocal market access to developing countries hence allows 
discrimination in favor of developing countries. Part IV of the GATT 1994 includes 
provisions on non-reciprocal preferential treatment for developing countries. However, 
developing countries claim that Part IV has been without practical value as it does not 
contain any obligations for developed countries.118  
 
An example of longer periods of transition is the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement. 
Developed countries had one year to implement their obligations, while developing 
countries were given 6 years with possibility of 5 years extension if they did not provide 
patent protection. LDCs do not have to be TRIPs compliant until 2013, with additional 
exceptions in relation to pharmaceuticals. See more about this in chapter 2.2.1. 
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Waivers from WTO rules may be granted by the General Council in accordance with 
Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement, e.g. the June 1999 waiver for LDCs.119 
 
The special and differential treatment measures set out through limited reciprocity in trade 
negotiations, temporary exemptions, and longer transitional periods for implementation of 
commitments provide important mechanisms for developing countries to adapt to 
international trade. Nevertheless, many are still far from fully integrated in the world 
trading system. 
 
 
1.4 Informal Consultations: Legitimate Bargaining or Democratic Deficit? 
There is a long history of tension between formal and informal processes of consultation 
and negotiation.120 The informal consultations in WTO negotiations are derived from the 
“principal supplier” principle of the GATT 1947, where the large traders set the premises.  
Tensions over informal meetings were spurred at the Seattle Ministerial Conference, as 
developing countries refused to accept the proposed agenda. Countries not invited to the 
Green Room shared their frustrations with the press, and a number of countries brought up 
the issue of exclusion from important negotiations, due to informal processes. 121 The 
question is whether these informal practices exclude the effective participation of 
developing countries, and hence are fundamentally undemocratic, or are they a legitimate 
bargaining tool which is necessary to achieve consensus, and thereby enable the making of 
new multilateral trade rules. 
 
On WTO Ministerial Conferences and the everyday operations, decisions are reached by 
consensus, not voting. Consensus is largely negotiated in informal meetings. These 
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meetings are often dominated by the Quad group, the US, EU, Japan and Canada.122 As an 
example the final negotiations of the Agreement on Agriculture in the Uruguay Round was 
negotiated between the EU and US, and then presented to the membership for adoption. 
This despite the fact that agriculture was one of the benefits offered developing countries as 
a trade-off so they should accept inclusion of new issues. The differences among the EU 
and the US regarding the appropriate level of protection and subsidizing was nevertheless 
the crucial point in the agriculture negotiations. 
 
The formal groups for trade negotiations within the WTO are the Ministerial Conference, 
the General Council, the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC), and several Negotiating 
Groups. These are established through Article IV of the WTO Agreement and paragraph 46 
of the Doha Declaration. However, informal consultations without any legal basis play a 
vital role in bringing the WTO membership to agreement. 
 
1.4.1 Experiences from GATT 
The Consultative Group of Eighteen (CG 18) existed from 1975 to 1985. It was temporarily 
established in 1975, but became permanent in 1979. The group debated the major policy 
issues, anticipated problems, and provided strategic direction for negotiations. It had an 
advisory function, and forwarded recommendations to the membership.  
 
Not unexpectedly, one of the major difficulties at the time it was established was to 
negotiate the composition of the group. The group consisted of 18 full members and 9 
alternate members with right to speak. The group mandate had a provision for rotating 
membership, namely “as appropriate”. The group was not transparent. Even papers 
prepared by the secretariat were not circulated to the membership.123 Detailed reports were 
however submitted to the GATT council. The group discussed a number of issues 
subsequently included in the Uruguay Round agenda, including TRIMS, TRIPs and GATS 
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issues. Major contributions to the transition from GATT to WTO were set out by the 
group.124  
 
However, composition difficulties and expanded membership made several members find 
the group to large to be efficient, and some argued that the group was inappropriate when 
the Uruguay Round was in progress. The group largely ceased to function after the process 
broke down in 1986 over disagreement over the launching of a new round. Many informal 
and ad hoc meetings after the establishment of the WTO were composed by many of the 
same members. These consultations discussed strategic issues as the CG18, but they did not 
have any mechanisms for reporting or power to recommend to the membership.  
The CG18 has close similarities to the IMF and World Bank Executive Boards, but with 
one important difference: it did not have authority to make decisions on behalf of the 
membership.  
 
1.4.2 Green Room Consultations 
The Green Room consultations have its name from the color of the Director-General’s 
conference room. These meetings consist of a limited group of the membership with more 
or less the same participants, a kind of “inner circle” meetings. They are either called by 
the Director-General, or the chairperson of a committee. There is a distinction between 
Green Room consultations used at Ministerial Conferences, and when used at an 
ambassadorial level regarding the regular business of the organization. This discussion is 
limited to the first, but many of the same considerations also goes for the latter. 
 
Trade negotiators can rarely explore the limits of their partners’ flexibility, or expose their 
own difficulties in big on-the-record meetings.125 Hence, the Green Room model deals with 
the problem of having too many parties present in a negotiation, as the WTO has no formal 
steering body with limited membership such as the executive boards of the IMF and the 
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World Bank. The Green Rooms do, however, resemble the executive boards. The important 
difference of the WTO consultations is that they are not a part of the formal organizational 
structure, and do not have any (formal) decision-making powers. There are hence no rules 
(or practices) ensuring a fair composition or transparency. The composition is however 
somewhat predictable, as these consultations mainly comprise large industrialized 
members.126 
 
The Green Room meetings have a limited number of participants, usually between 20 and 
40.127 110 or more members are hence routinely excluded from the consultations. This is 
not a problem when narrow issues involving only a small part of the membership are 
negotiated. It is also useful for consultations with delegations from the countries crucial for 
a solution on the issue, i.e. resolving problems among key opponents.  
 
However, the main problem of Green Room consultations is exposed when members 
wanting to participate in meetings are excluded. Exclusion of members with legitimate 
interests in the issue at hand from key negotiations is not democratic, particularly when the 
process does not follow rules of transparency and rotation of the membership. After Green 
Room consultations, further negotiations on an issue are often not possible due to time 
limits and substantial agendas. The option of the remainder of the membership is in such 
situations either to accept or decline the proposition from the meeting submitted to the 
membership. Compromises are hence in effect struck behind the back of a large part of the 
membership.  
 
The Green Room had a large role under the GATT, where concessions were negotiated 
under the “principal supplier” principle. The countries primarily concerned, mostly large 
and industrialized nations, negotiated solutions that subsequently were submitted to the 
other members. However, many circumstances have changed considerably since the 
GATT. 
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First of all, the membership has increased, and the Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1994 
included a large number of developing countries. Secondly, the scope and range of issues 
proliferated with the Uruguay Round. Many of the new agreements have a greater and 
more direct impact on the members, in particular the “behind the border” regulatory 
regimes such as in services, intellectual property, investment, and competition, and are 
hence of key importance to most members. Further, developing countries have gained a 
greater ability to participate in WTO negotiations due to an increasing number of emerging 
and transition economies, and technical and financial assistance. Furthermore, the 
multilateral approach through the Single Undertaking makes all agreements mandatory 
(except two plurilateral), which contrasts with the voluntary approach that developed under 
GATT. Finally, the losing party in a dispute can no longer block dispute settlement 
decision. The legally binding character of the obligations has hence become stronger. 
 
The limited flexibilities in terms of the Single Undertaking and binding dispute settlement, 
and the “behind the border” tendency of WTO policy, makes participation in the 
negotiations increasingly important to all members. 
 
Petersmann (2005) argues that the Green Room consultations are not a north-south issue, 
but rather an insider-outsider issue. The background for this statement is that a large part of 
the membership actually is excluded from these meetings, not only developing countries. 
However, the solutions negotiated in the Green Room are likely to be somewhat more in 
accordance with developed countries’ interests. The usual composition of the meetings 
includes a number of major industrialized nations, and a few large developing countries 
such as Brazil and India. Developed countries are hence both of majority in number and 
power when brokering compromises. Further, the interests of emerging and partly 
industrialized developing economies are in most issues not representative for the bulk of 
developing countries, and the interests of most developed countries have in many issues a 
tendency to be more harmonized than those between developed and developing countries. 
This is particularly true in issues of great importance to many developing countries, such as 
agriculture, textiles and intellectual property regulation. The effects of the Green Room 
process are hence frequently more detrimental to the interests of developing countries, and 
the issue must be characterized as having a north-south dimension. 
 48 
Green Room consultations are organized ad hoc; as mentioned above, they do not follow 
explicit rules or guidelines. The only thing that is quite constant from meeting to meeting is 
the composition; the same large, industrialized countries have in effect permanent seats.128 
These consultations are, however, largely tolerated because they are recognized as 
necessary in order to reach consensus.  
 
Developing countries have put forth proposals for institutional reform, which makes WTO-
functioning tightly bound to clearly specified rules and procedures. Reluctance from major 
traders have, however, effectively prevented such developments. In a WTO meeting in 
2002 on the “Functioning and Financing of the WTO”, it was noted that some informal 
ground rules for consultations were established in the aftermath of the Seattle Ministerial 
Conference and that these should be refined and codified.129 It included announcing 
consultations in small groups, requests by Members to be included in such consultations, 
sharing information from the “open-ended” meetings, and that decisions should only be 
taken in such open-ended meetings.130 Resuscitation of the CG 18 was also discussed, e.g. 
formal establishment of a limited membership body. However, no further measures have 
subsequently been set out. 
 
1.4.3 Implications of Informal Consultations 
Members have a tendency not to change their positions in meetings including the full 
membership. Meetings in limited membership groups are indeed necessary to achieve 
compromises under the existing institutional framework. As mentioned above, it is an 
effective mechanism when issues with a limited number of interests are involved. 
However, most issues in the actual negotiations affect a larger number of countries due to 
the reasons pointed out above, and often in a substantial manner. If a limited membership 
process is to have democratic legitimacy, the composition of the group has to be somewhat 
representative for the membership. Otherwise, power imbalances might be exacerbated as 
small and most developing countries are not admitted to key negotiations.  
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The ways in which decisions are prepared and negotiated naturally affect their outcome. 
This is the so-called structure-substance pairing effect. The GATT system persisted in 
terms of largely informal negotiating structures defined for each round.131 The GATT 
cultures that made the participation of developing countries in the GATT marginal, have 
persisted in the decision-making procedures of the WTO. Pascal Lamy, the Director-
General of the WTO, admits that informal meetings often entail a predetermination of 
issues among coalitions of states.132 Informality and flexibility (i.e. lack of precise rules) 
may be needed to make compromises in difficult negotiations.  
 
Members rarely change their positions in meetings of the full membership.133 Brokering 
compromises in smaller groups alleviate the process of finding compromises, and is 
legitimate when the parties are somewhat equal. However, most developing country 
economies are somewhat dependant on the large members of the WTO, such as the US, 
EU, or Japan in terms of imports, exports, aid, security, etc. Obstruction of consensus in the 
WTO might threaten these connections for the dissenting developing nations. 
 
A Stanford research paper concludes that the informal “concentric circles” model can only 
damage the WTOs ability to function, and its internal and external credibility.134 Although 
there has been less use of the Green Room after the Uruguay Round, informal meetings are 
still central for reaching consensus in the WTO. The influence on negotiations related to 
economic strength may seem to be exacerbated by such informal meetings, which hence 
represents a democratic deficit. 
 
To formally establish a limited member sub-group would indeed be difficult, as it requires 
consensus of the whole membership [Article IX of the WTO Agreement]. At the least, 
guidelines for informal consultations should be established in order to increase 
transparency and the predictability of their composition. This would facilitate and 
legitimize this way of negotiating solutions and consensus. However, finding a 
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representative and feasible selection for the 149 members is in itself a difficult task with 
probable failure in the negotiations. The solutions that are negotiated in informal meetings 
must be recommendations, and cannot be decisions that bind the membership. When 
negotiations are organized in such a way that the proposition of the Green Room 
consultations is the only option for an agreement, the consensus process provides an 
element of an exclusionary device for powerful countries. Alternative solutions should 
hence be put forth to prevent the “bad deal or no deal” option.  
 
Developing countries are in the Green Room consultations not only outweighed in terms of 
economic and political power, but also in numbers. George Monbiot wrote in the Guardian 
that “[i]n principle, the poor members of the WTO can and should outvote the rich ones. In 
practice, its democratic structure has been bypassed by the notorious "green room" 
meetings organized by the rich nations, by corporate lobbying and by the secret and 
unaccountable committees of the corporate lawyers it uses to resolve trade disputes.” 
 
There is a lack of attention to procedural issues in the WTO, so-called “horizontal 
issues”.135 It has been brought up by developing countries a number of times, has been 
included in Ministerial Declarations, and addressed in a General Council meeting in 2001. 
However, these efforts have not led to any alterations regarding informal structures. 
  
Limited membership groups seem inevitable within the existing institutional structure of 
the WTO. However, the main problem of all the informal groups is the lack of 
predictability and transparency. There are no rules ensuring a democratic composition, and 
no mechanisms for sharing the progress and outcome of the meetings with the rest of the 
WTO membership. Establishing rules for composition of key members on the issue at 
hand, as well as a transfer of solutions to the membership and transparency, would give the 
meetings a more legitimate character, and prevent exacerbation of power imbalances. 
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1.5 Improvements and Alternatives 
The need for global governance increases rapidly, especially within the area of trade. 
Technological progress and the rapid growth of emerging and transitional markets are 
among the factors. The WTO rules and agreements, however, have not followed this 
progress; they largely remain status quo. In addition, the Organization suffers from a lack 
of democratic procedures. There are hence problems with the democratic qualities, and the 
efficiency in WTO decision-making and negotiations. The negotiations on agriculture were 
one of the main reasons for the deadlock in the Doha round of negotiations, which were 
suspended at the end of July 2006.136 Even if the current round of negotiations should be 
brought to conclusion, it seems clear that the current system does not function satisfactory 
in either of the two regards mentioned. 
 
The regulation of negotiations and decision-making must be balanced between democratic 
considerations ensuring all members an appropriate say, and the need for effectiveness in 
developing new world trade rules. As mentioned above, these features are to some degree 
antagonistic. Democratic procedures are often very time-consuming, but should be 
regarded to the greatest extent possible within an appropriate time-frame. However, a 
question in this regard is whether other negotiation and decision-making models could 
strengthen both as well as attaining a more appropriate balance in comparison to the current 
system.  
 
The decision-making and negotiations of the WTO can be improved in two ways: Either by 
amending the rules and agreements, or by changing the practices, i.e. within the existing 
legal framework. This chapter discusses the recommendations forwarded in the Sutherland 
Report, the multilateral versus the plurilateral approach, voting versus consensus, and 
possible improvements within the consensus process. 
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1.5.1 Responsibiliy for Procedural Issues 
It is often argued that the WTO is either more or less than its member countries, leading to 
statements such as “If WTO is medieval, it’s because the world is too”.137 James Bacchus, 
US trade representative, points out that the WTO is only a label on the vast majority of the 
world’s nations in their common efforts to make the international trade flow smoother.138 
Further, that the WTO is either more or less than its membership, and that it is democratic 
to the extent its members are democracies, hence being inseparable from the individual 
legitimacy of each member. This reasoning is flawed. In accordance with the structure-
substance pairing principle, the ways by which decisions are made and prepared affects the 
outcome139. The WTO negotiations are a power-struggle outside the boundaries of national, 
democratic arenas. Each country attempts to get their national interests through, usually to 
the greatest extent possible. Although the representatives to the WTO are elected by the 
leaders of the member governments, and these define the outcome of negotiations, 
domestic rules and democratic processes do not apply to the WTO. The WTO itself has 
rules and procedures governing the democratic structure and operation of negotiations and 
decision-making. These rules and procedures are partly negotiated among the members of 
the WTO, but most of them are derived from the customs and diplomatic practices 
developed under GATT 1947. The content and enforcement of these rules, and absence of 
such, determine the extent to which the WTO has democratic legitimacy. It can hence not 
be measured by the aggregation of the members’ democratic legitimacy. It must be 
measured from the rules, practices and outcome of the interaction that takes place in the 
WTO system.  
 
This kind of disclaiming of responsibility is common in the rhetoric of some WTO officials 
and members in relation to criticism of the fundamental features of the existing system. In 
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the transparency-issue, the same rhetoric is applied, placing the responsibility on each 
member. This approach leads to a pulverization of responsibility that should not be 
tolerated from an inter-governmental organization of such size and importance as the 
WTO. The WTO must be accountable for the democratic legitimacy of its procedures and 
structures, and therefore establish adequate rules that ensure democratic governance. Issues 
regarding the fundamental features of the WTO as an international body should hence be 
solved collectively, and not be left to each member. Again, the lack of attention to 
procedural issues in the WTO is damaging to developing countries.  
 
1.5.2 The Sutherland Report 
The Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi of the WTO created a Consultative Board of 
eight independent persons in June 2003.140 The Consultative Board shall “look at the state 
of the World Trade Organization as an institution, to study and clarify the institutional 
challenges that the system faced and to consider how the WTO could be reinforced and 
equipped to meet them”.141 In January 2005, the Consultative Board released a report: The 
Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium, also called 
the Sutherland Report after the name of the chairman. The Director-General clarifies the 
aim of the report in the foreword: “The essential purpose of this Report is to examine the 
functioning of the institution – the WTO – and consider how well equipped it is to carry the 
weight of future responsibilities and demands.” The report sets forth a number of 
recommendations which are up to the membership to negotiate and set out. 
 
The report identifies decision-making as a key challenge, and discusses whether the 
consensus rule should be modified. It notes that consensus is increasingly difficult to 
achieve due a to growing membership and the amount of sensitive issues, and recommends 
making distinctions for “certain types of decisions, such as purely procedural issues”. For 
such issues, it opens for alternative methods such as voting.  
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It further recommends a number of other measures ensuring efficiency in decision-making, 
including annual Ministerial Conferences instead of the existing biennial, and the 
establishment of a senior official’s consultative body.142 Annual Ministerial Conferences 
would further exacerbate the ability of many developing countries to participate effectively 
in the WTO. It would probably also further increase the pace of expansion to new issues 
issues. However, it could also have positive effects if the agenda is not expanded. The 
negotiation processes would be afforded more time, which could have positive effects on 
the way in which consensus is achieved. This could prevent some cases of adoption of 
informal group proposals because of the negotiation deadline - the “bad deal or no deal” 
option.  
 
The proposed senior official’s consultative body shall gather senior policy-makers from 
capitals two to four times a year. The membership shall be limited to a maximum of 30 
seats, with permanent seats for major trading nations but a majority of seats filled on a 
rotating basis. The consultative body suggested is quite similar to the CG 18 described 
above in chapter 1.4, which operated under the GATT from 1975 to 1985. As pointed out 
there, the CG 18 is in many ways similar to the Executive Boards of the IMF and the World 
Bank, but without formal decision-making power. This is also the feature of the suggested 
consultative board. Its functions would be limited to discussing the “political/economic 
environment as well as current dossiers”, and provide “some political guidance to 
negotiators”.143 A steering body with decision-making powers is not discussed in the 
Report. That is probably because of the explicit limitation of the Report to “less radical 
approaches”. 
 
The proposed body is not far from a formalization of the Green Room consultations. 
Positive aspects of a formalization is, as discussed in chapter 1.4.3, that rules and 
guidelines on predictability through rotating membership and transparency could be 
established. Agreement on which countries should be represented is a difficult task. A 
permanent membership of the body would be highly controversial, and would probably not 
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be possible to agree on. A varying membership with equal right to participation could be 
feasible, but also the tasks and role of the body is likely to create controversy. The 
controversy that has been attached to the Green Room process, is likely to make the 
negotiations on composition and rotation very difficult. As commented above, this was one 
of the great difficulties when the Consultative Group of 18 was established. Furthermore, 
the reluctance from several large traders on decreasing the current flexibilities would 
probably be prohibitive in the current political climate of the WTO.  
 
The report further recommends examining plurilateral agreements as a tool where it is 
impossible to move forward in negotiations and a group of members are willing to pursue 
the issue under voluntary signing. This approach, with different obligations for the various 
members, is called “variable geometry” in the report. It was used in the Tokyo Round 
(1973-1979) under the GATT, and was then proven unsuccessful. However, the use of 
GATT codes proliferated, and ended up with a mix of 180 codes with largely differentiated 
membership. A condition for the plurilateral approach must hence be that it is limited to a 
few issues of great importance to a group of members. An opening for this approach could 
decelerate the pursuit of bilateral and regional arrangements, which have proliferated in 
recent years among others due to the numerous failures of WTO negotiations. The report 
expresses concern over the proliferation of preferential trade agreements and its impact on 
the national treatment and MFN rules in recent years.  
 
It also suggests requiring a written declaration from members blocking a widely supported 
proposal, addressing the specific negative effects for the country’s vital interests, and 
thereby making it more difficult politically for countries to block a widely supported 
solution without compelling reasons.144 However, requiring such a statement is not likely to 
change the mind of large nations when blocking a proposal, e.g. when the US blocked the 
solution put forth on an interim waiver on the paragraph 6 issue under the TRIPs 
Agreement in December 2002, the so-called Motta text (see chapter 2.5.1). It could have an 
effect if one or a few small and developing countries considered to block a decision. This 
would however participate in exacerbating the power-imbalances in the WTO negotiation-
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process, which can not desirable. Further, it would be problematic to enforce the 
requirements of the statement by forcing the blocking countries to be specific on the 
“compelling reasons”. Such an arrangement would probably end up with a repetition of the 
reasons stated in the negotiations prior to the blocking, and would have little or no actual 
effect in terms of enhanced ability of the WTO membership to reach consensus on 
important issues.  
 
1.5.3 Multilateral versus Plurilateral Approach 
In accordance with Article X (9) of the WTO Agreement, inclusion of plurilateral 
agreements require consensus. According to Article II (3), plurilateral agreements are 
binding upon the accepting members, but signatories are not required to apply them on an 
MFN basis – so-called conditional MFN.  
 
The basic problems of a plurilateral approach within the WTO is who should be allowed to 
participate in the negotiations, whether the plurilateral agreements should be applied on an 
MFN basis, and how the DSU and DSB would apply to such agreements. Many developing 
countries have also expressed concern of pressure to sign such agreements in relation to the 
unilateral request system set out under the GATS.145 Further, the rules of new plurilateral 
agreements are likely to reflect the interests of high-income countries: Advanced developed 
countries have pressed on for the inclusion of new issues, in particular typical advanced-
economy issues such as the Singapore issues.  
 
As a WTO objective is a multilateral trade policy, the WTO predominately uses this 
approach for several reasons. First of all, progress in sensitive areas such as agriculture is 
possible because of the “across the table” and “single undertaking” approach. However, 
complex negotiations with largely different interests presented leads to inefficiency in 
decision-making and compromises among the large traders that might have detrimental 
effects to the interests of small and developing members. The WTO multilateral 
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negotiations offer a great potential, and is indeed a desirable approach for making 
international trade rules.  
 
The difficulties reaching consensus with the multilateral approach is often caused by the 
structure of the WTO membership. Increased participation of developing countries and the 
increasing importance of emerging market economies such as India and China in the 
international trading system make the interests that have to be reconciled in negotiations 
largely diverse. This development was illustrated when the Doha negotiations again was 
suspended in July 2006.146  
 
However, massive difficulties face the advancement of multilateral trade rules and hence 
international trade due to both the principle and consensus, but also the single undertaking 
principle: Experiences from ministerials show large time requirements, reluctance in 
reneging national interests, and numerous deadlocks. The question is whether the 
plurilateral approach should be allowed on more issues to facilitate agreement on these 
areas, and alleviate the pressure on developing countries for further expansion and 
implementation. This way, developing countries would not be pushed into cumbersome 
negotiations they do not want to participate in. 
 
This has led to a rapid increase in members pursuing their trade through bilateral and 
regional trade agreements. This is not desirable for global trade due to competitive 
distortions, sensitive areas are phased out, weakening the multilateral trade, not effective 
dispute settlement; large traders would in greater extent than in the WTO be able to abuse 
their position.  
 
Currently, all WTO Agreements apply to all members, except two. The two plurilateral 
agreements, which are attached to Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement, are the Agreement on 
Trade in Civil Aircraft [Annex 4 (a)], Agreement on Government Procurement [Annex 4 
(b)]. The International Dairy Agreement [former Annex 4 (c)], and the International Bovine 
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Meat Agreement [former Annex 4 (d)] were deleted in accordance with Article X (9) of the 
WTO agreement. Allowing plurilateral agreements makes it possible to establish rules on 
areas where consensus cannot be reached by the multilateral approach. The negotiations are 
likely to be easier with more homogenous participants. In addition, it enables rules that take 
greater concern of the respective interests involved. 
 
The benefits of applying a plurilateral approach is that smaller groups of participants have 
to reach agreement and the participants can change from issue to issue. This facilitates 
greater flexibility in content and scope of the agreement. The approach could be applied on 
issues where reaching consensus among all WTO members has shown itself impossible, 
such as several of the Singapore issues.  
 
A plurilateral approach on issues highly controversial to some countries and very desirable 
and important to others, such as the Singapore issues, could increase the making of trade 
rules on such areas and prevent members from pursuing bilateral and regional 
arrangements. As discussed above, such arrangements may further exacerbate power-
imbalances when employed between developed and developing countries. However, it 
could be argued that a plurilateral approach might weaken the ability to reach compromises 
on sensitive under the issues single undertaking and thereby undermine the multilateral 
approach. This would however depend on the extent of plurilateralism.  
 
As the Cancun Ministerial Conference ended in deadlock in September 2003, the EC stated 
that it is desirable to pursue the issues multilaterally, but that it may adopt a new approach 
and remove the issues from the single undertaking of the negotiations and negotiate them 
as plurilateral agreements if necessary. The EU also proposed a plurilateral approach to 
boost the service liberalization under the GATS Agreement. The GATS is only a 
framework for liberalization of services, as a multilateral agreement on liberalization of 
specific service sectors has not been possible. The approach for liberalization under GATS 
has so far been bilateral requests. A plurilateral approach under GATS was included in the 
mandate set out in the ministerial declaration, and agreed upon at the Hong Kong 
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Ministerial Conference. The system for services liberalization now includes collective 
requests.147 
 
Consensus brings with it a risk of paralysis and subsequent flight to other forums. 
However, there is little support for radical changes of the decision-making procedures. This 
may be caused by the awareness of the advantages of consensus among the members, and 
not least the likelihood of achieving agreement on an alternative. This is also the reason to 
why substantive changes were not suggested in the Sutherland Report, as radical reform 
would not “have commanded the degree of support necessary for them to be affected”.148  
 
The plurilateral approach could be one way to proceed on difficult areas e.g. the Singapore 
issues. As mentioned above, the request-system under the GATS has been made plurilateral 
through so-called collective requests. The plurilateral approach must of course be applied 
with caution, because it could undermine and weaken the multilateral framework, and 
create gaps between groups of the membership in terms of obligations and participation. It 
also may create problems in regard to application of the MFN rule and the dispute 
settlement system, as was evident in the plurilateral proliferation under the GATT. 
 
1.5.4 Consensus versus Voting 
Reaching agreement among the 149 members of the WTO is necessarily a troublesome 
process. The basic features of the consensus-model further exacerbate the time-
requirements and the probability of deadlock.  
 
It could be argued that if voting was the general rule in the WTO, developing countries in 
power of numbers, given the fact that they account for about three fourths of the WTO 
membership, would be able to force through their solutions without regard to other 
members’ interests. This is of course given that they vote as a block. In that case, they 
could outvote developed countries both on a rule of two-thirds majority and three-fourths 
majority of the votes. However, given the large differences in trading, technological and 
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development advancement within the group, risks of exclusion of developed countries are 
an unlikely scenario. It would nevertheless provide sufficient doubt among developed 
countries for such a solution to gain the support necessary.  
 
However, the majority of vote approach could be applied in a limited scope rather than 
replacing the consensus model, which would probably be a more feasible solution than any 
of the alternatives presented above. For example, majority of vote could be applied for 
some types of decisions without large significance, in particular procedural issues. Election 
of Director-General, and negotiation formula and agenda for Ministerial Conferences have 
shown to be controversial, bearing in mind the experiences on these issues at Seattle and 
Doha. A majority of vote rule for these issues would hence not be likely to be viable.  
 
The Sutherland Report opens for alternative ways of decision-making for “purely 
procedural issues”, but it also states that “voting is rarely, if ever, a wise alternative” to 
consensus decision-making.149 However, deadlocks on ministerials are seldom caused by 
disagreement on such decisions, rather the solution on sensitive areas or even the entire 
package. A majority of vote on procedural issues could facilitate some of the decision-
making, but would not prevent stalemate on large issues. To apply a majority of vote for 
some decisions would not require amendment, only a change in the practice, as voting is 
already allowed as a secondary way of reaching a decision. For important issues, including 
application and interpretation of rules and adoption of new rules, consensus is probably the 
only feasible solution.150  
 
As provided for in the WTO Agreement, voting can be used if consensus cannot be 
achieved. If this procedure were made operational, it could give powerful members an 
incentive to accommodate developing countries in a greater extent in the consensus 
process, as if consensus cannot be achieved, developing countries would have a greater say 
in the following voting.   
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The weighted voting system set out in the World Bank is based on financial contributions. 
In the WTO, the basis for the weight could be share of world trade, population, degree of 
market openness, GDP etc., either using one of them, or two or more in combination.  
Large members have several times advocated a trade-weighted voting system, e.g. in 
relation to election of Director-General. To achieve consensus among the WTO members 
on which combination that should be applied is indeed a troublesome task.  It seems 
literally impossible in the present political climate within the WTO membership, bearing in 
mind the difficulties reaching consensus on relatively simple issues and the many failures 
since the establishment of the WTO. In addition, most members have expressed general 
scepticism and reluctance to radical institutional changes.151 
 
Consensus gives small and poor nations some degree of influence due to their possibility of 
blocking decisions, and increases the likelihood of implementation compared to majority of 
vote. Decisions forced upon a member by majority of vote could raise implementation 
problems.  
 
1.5.5 Improvements to the Consensus Process 
In the Uruguay Round, attempts were made to formalize and legalize some of the decision 
making procedures, but the WTO adhered to GATT practices. These weaknesses were 
though probably what made it politically feasible for the major trading nations; as pointed 
out above, the flexibilities entailed by informality is an effective tool for these members to 
pursue national interests, often on expense of weaker participants. 
 
As concluded above, the practice of consensus on important issues is unlikely to be 
changed. Facilitation of the consensus process hence has to be examined. Paralysis of 
negotiations, which we have several examples of after the establishment of the WTO, 
results in members seeking other forums for trade cooperation. There has been a rapid 
increase in bilateral and regional trade cooperation the previous years.152  
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At a General Council meeting in June 2002, procedural guidelines to govern the 
preparatory processes of Ministerial Conferences and the decision-making at the 
Conferences were discussed.153 The members were divided as to whether there should be 
such guidelines, or if the current flexible procedure was the best way to proceed. 
Procedures for election of Director-General when consensus cannot be achieved were also 
addressed. The disputed trade-weighted voting proposal was raised again, but rejected by 
Brazil and India. 
 
The Like-Minded Group (LMG) comprised of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe presented a set of proposals aimed at preventing flexible 
procedures such as the ones adopted at Doha Ministerial Conference. A counter-proposal 
was presented by the “group of nine”, comprising Australia, Canada, Chile, Hong Kong, 
China, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore and Switzerland. This group rejected the 
criticisms against the procedures adopted at Doha, and did not see the need for additional 
or different procedures.  
 
The EC and Japan wanted to keep the flexible non-procedures as at Doha, and in the matter 
of Director-General election, they expectantly preferred trade-weighted voting. Norway’s 
ambassador Kaare Bryn, then General Council chairman, acknowledged that strict rules 
and procedures might not be the solution, but advocated guidelines that could enhance the 
predictability of the processes at Ministerial Conferences. The clear north-south conflict on 
this issue reflects the interests of large traders in favor of having a flexible system – i.e. 
status quo. This illustrates that such an open and flexible process is beneficial to the major 
traders, as commented above.  
 
An institutional change would hence be extremely difficult – new multilateral trade rules in 
itself is difficult, amendment of the decision-making rules seems almost impossible within 
the present political climate of the WTO. The easiest and probably the only way currently 
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to achieve a more effective, democratic, transparent, and fair decision-making process is by 
modifying the present procedures within the existing rules.  
 
The existing flexibility of the WTO Agreement can be used to address a number of 
problems in the negotiation and decision-making processes. Changes in procedures within 
the existing rules are either way a good starting point when addressing these issues. 
Different procedures could be explored pragmatically. If a new practice is proven more 
effective than the existing, it could be extended to other areas. It would reveal the possible 
needs for a legislative change, and when adequate support is gained, it could be established 
formally. 
 
It seems clear that within the existing institutional framework of the WTO, there must be 
flexibilities that facilitate the process of negotiating compromises among key nations and 
opponents. However, to conserve the democratic balance in these processes, clear and 
invariable guidelines should be established formally to provide transparency and 
predictability. A body that oversees and enforces these guidelines with a report-mechanism 
to the General Council should be established to ensure that the rules are followed. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
The WTO has become a powerful institution, changing national and international policies 
in a variety of issues. That such power is accompanied by adequate rules ensuring 
democratic, transparent and predictable procedures is imperative for its ability to deliver 
fair outcomes and preserve wide support in the long run. As mentioned in the introduction, 
there is an imbalance between the dispute settlement system and the political processes of 
the WTO in terms of efficiency and legitimacy. 
 
Although Article IX of the WTO Agreement sets out a principle of secondary voting when 
consensus cannot be achieved, the decision-making practice of the Organization is almost 
exclusively based on consensus. This may disfavor developing countries in some decisions, 
as their strength in numbers would be more advantageous under a voting model. However, 
if voting was widely employed, the wish to obtain a more favorable result in the voting 
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round could undermine the consensus model through proliferation of blocking. After all, 
consensus is in principle a democratic way of reaching decisions.  
 
The practice of consensus increases the legitimacy of the decision-making process, as the 
minority cannot be outvoted and hence being forced to accept decisions. In addition, 
consensus facilitates ratification. The efficiency of WTO decision-making is, however, 
confined by the practice, as it is time-consuming and very sensitive to deadlocks. 
Legitimacy and efficiency are hence largely opposite considerations where an increase in 
one may lead to a decrease of the other.  
 
Since the establishment of the WTO, both the internal and external transparency have been 
improved substantially through various measures. E.g. NGOs have been allowed to attend 
Ministerial Conferences, derestriction-periods have decreased, and the WTO web-site has 
become an important information-channel to both civil society and member governments. 
However, timely access should be provided for all documents unless weighty reasons are 
presented. Increased participation of NGOs is indeed a difficult issue without any simple 
solutions. Information diffusion to civil society and national governments, and monitoring 
the functioning of the WTO are among the pro’s. The worries of developing countries in 
that increased access could further displace power imbalances due to the powerful lobbies 
and interest groups of developed countries, is a pertinent con. If further access should be 
allowed, stringent procedures for interaction between NGOs and the WTO members and 
staff must be established. 
 
Single undertaking and cross issue linkage provide flexibilities in the negotiation-approach 
adapted to the political challenges of the issue at hand, which is often necessary to 
conclude negotiations successfully. However, issue-linkage can exacerbate power 
asymmetries within the WTO membership, as developing countries may have to sign 
agreements that do not serve their development objectives in order to obtain market access 
on preferential areas of trade. This approach should not further disadvantages to the 
participation and say of poor and small members in the negotiations. To ensure this, ground 
rules on allowed approaches and how they are to by employed should be established.  
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Although special and differential treatment measures increase the ability of developing 
countries to participate in negotiations and implement their WTO obligations, many are far 
from fully integrated into the world trading system. Further efforts should be made to 
ensure active participation and financial and technical assistance for implementation. The 
problems many developing countries face regarding active participation in negotiations and 
large costs of implementation is not and cannot be adequately resolved by financial and 
technical assistance. A more flexible approach regarding developing country commitments 
should be employed, and increased efforts should be made to facilitate enhanced market 
access and benefits from participation in the WTO. 
 
Limited membership groups seem inevitable within the existing institutional structure of 
the WTO. However, in the Green Room consultations, developing countries are not only 
outweighed in terms of economic and political power, but also in numbers. There are no 
rules ensuring a democratic and fair composition, and no mechanisms for sharing the 
progress and outcome of the meetings with the rest of the WTO membership. Systematic 
exclusion of a majority of the membership entails a serious democratic problem. The role 
of such consultations should also be elaborated upon to prevent predetermination of issues. 
Establishing rules for the composition of key members on the issue at hand, and transfering 
progress and solutions to the membership, would give them a more legitimate character and 
prevent exacerbation of power imbalances.  
An institutional reform of the WTO seems almost impossible within the current 
circumstances and political climate. The reluctance and disagreement have been made clear 
in several meetings.154 Many countries have stated that they do not want changes to the 
institutional framework. It is however desirable, and should be persistently addressed and 
discussed in WTO fora. Until a sustainable solution is agreed upon, changes should be 
made to the current practices within the existing legal framework. These changes should be 
formalized and binding in order to prevent backtracking of achievements and the 
commitments made, as was illustrated in the aftermath of the Doha Declaration. On a 
limited scale, the plurilateral approach should be further explored and applied. 
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2 Case: The TRIPs Agreement and Patent Protection on 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Increasing competition from emerging and industrializing economies in Asia and Latin 
America on manufactured goods disadvantages American and European trading 
interests.155 The intellectual property (IP) protection in developing countries was generally 
weaker than in the developed nations of North America and Europe, with limited scope, 
shorter period of protection, no patent-granting mechanisms for foreign right holders and 
weak enforcement.156 Copies of products that were patent-protected in North America and 
Europe were produced on a large scale in several developing countries, and the right-holder 
who financed the innovation missed potential sales in foreign markets.  
 
This problem was addressed in the Uruguay Round of negotiations (1986-1994). The 
solution that emerged both within the WTO and in the North American Free Trade 
Association (NAFTA), was harmonization of domestic regulations of the member states by 
setting out minimum requirements of intellectual property protection, facilitate patent-filing 
in foreign countries, and introduce border-measure obligations. 
 
2.1.1 The Concept of Intellectual Property 
Intellectual property can be defined as information that has economic value when put into 
use in the marketplace.157 More specific, intellectual property is a term for legal 
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entitlements attached to particular information, ideas, etc.158 The patent-holder has various 
exclusive rights in relation to the subject of the IP. Patents provide the patent owner with 
legal means to prevent others from making, using, or selling the new invention for a limited 
period of time, subject to a number of exceptions.159  
 
The rationale behind IP protection is that the research and development (R&D) leading to 
inventions and new products often is expensive, in particular within the area of 
pharmaceuticals which requires advanced science and technology. IP rights provide 
incentives for such activity, as investments in R&D can be reimbursed through the 
monopoly on the invention provided for by the IP protection. The degree of investment in 
R&D, and the innovation and technological progress as a consequence, will hence increase 
with the level of IP protection, as the economic incentives increase.  
 
However, the temporary monopoly that IP protection provides, entails losses in consumer 
welfare. A high level of protection will affect the accessibility of inventions due to 
prohibitive prices, and the public benefits of R&D activities decrease. The optimal level of 
protection is therefore at a level which on the one hand provides R&D incentives that lead 
to technological progress, and on the other hand provides inventions affordable to most of 
its potential users. There is no simple solution when deciding on which level to apply, as 
the type of regulatory regime and the level of protection that is optimal, varies with a 
circumstances of the country in which it is applied.  
 
The appropriate level of protection is dependent on the importance of innovation to the 
country’s economy. If innovation is an important part of a country’s economy, it is rational 
to provide a high level of protection, as it will stimulate and protect investment in these 
activities, and prevent free-riding. Developing countries have traditionally had a low level 
of protection due to limited purchasing-power and investment capacity, as well as 
technological competence. Diffusion of existing knowledge is hence desirable, which is 
facilitated through a low level of protection.  
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2.1.2 Intellectual Property in International Trade 
IP were largely excluded under GATT, and there was no specific agreement on IP rights. 
However, Article XX of GATT 1947 provides a general exception to obligations for 
“measures … necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those related to … the 
protection of patents, trade-marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive 
practices”. Such measures must, however, not be “applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade”. Measures 
otherwise inconsistent with the Agreement could hence be set out on exports and imports to 
promote compliance with intellectual property rights.  
 
Intellectual property was one of the new issues included in the Uruguay Round (1986-
1994). IP rights have traditionally been a matter of domestic regulation. The TRIPs 
Agreement was the first time IP rules were incorporated in the international trading system. 
It illustrates the “behind the borders” tendency of the WTO regulatory regime, where the 
WTO imposes obligations on domestic regulation and hence confines the regulatory 
options of national policymakers. This tendency is sometimes referred to as externalization 
of domestic regulation.160 
 
The negotiations of the TRIPs Agreement had a clear North-South confrontation, as 
developing countries traditionally have little or no IP protection, both in terms of narrow 
scope and short period of protection.161 Article II (1) provides that “[n]ationals of any 
country of the Union shall, as regards advantages that their respective laws now grant, or 
may hereafter grant to nationals”. The TRIPs Agreement deals with a variety of IP rights, 
including patents on pharmaceuticals. The Agreement sets out the minimum patent 
protection period to 20 years, and was reluctantly accepted as a part of the Single 
Undertaking.162 
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2.1.3 Counterfeit Drugs 
The world is facing an immense problem regarding counterfeit medicines. Most 
counterfeits are substandard pharmaceuticals which are manufactured below established 
standards of safety, quality and efficacy.163 Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and 
generic products. The term “counterfeit medicines” refers to products with the correct 
ingredients but fake packaging, with wrong active ingredients, without active ingredients, 
or with insufficient active ingredients.164 Most counterfeits contain incorrect level of the 
drug’s active ingredient, resulting in increased likelyhood of drug resistance.165 
 
For people infected by wide-spread infectious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and 
HIV/AIDS, drug resistance has catastrophic consequences as new drugs must be developed 
to treat the resistant strain. A 2004 study estimates that 85 percent of malaria drugs in 
Nigeria are ineffective.166 
 
One of the important functions of patent-protection is to prevent counterfeits. But herein 
lies a dilemma: If the IP protection on pharmaceuticals was decreased and cheap generic 
version were made available, the counterfeit market would not be as competitive on price 
as currently is the case. The TRIPs Agreement attempts to address this issue also through 
provisions on border measures requirements [section 4].  
 
2.1.4 Access to Medicines in Developing Countries 
Most developing countries have little technical and innovative capacity, which is also 
reflected in their level of protection prior to the TRIPs Agreement. However, they largely 
bear the costs of implementation as the standards set out in the TRIPs agreement are largely 
in accordance with the systems established in most of the developed world. The obligations 
on patent protection is hence costly to developing countries both implementation-wise and 
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because medicines are becoming more expensive due to patent protection and demands for 
remuneration from generic producers. 
 
In the Uruguay Round, pharmaceutical companies claimed that their R&D activities are 
handicapped because of the lack of IP protection in developing countries.167 This rhetoric is 
largely flawed, as the bulk of the population in most developing countries does not have 
sufficient economic capacity to buy patent-protected medicines. Only ten percent of the 
population in Africa infected with HIV/AIDS have access to ARV treatment.168 Mostly, the 
reason has been prohibitive prices: until the patent expired, the price on one year of ARV 
treatment was some $10,000.169 Developing country-specific drugs such as malaria 
treatment do not provide the same research and development incentives as medicines with a 
“western market”, as the purchasing power of developing country citizens is significantly 
lower. Drug-resistance against existing treatments for these kinds of diseases is therefore 
particularly devastating.  
 
The TRIPs Agreement attempts to strike a balance between private and public interests.170 
The TRIPs Agreement has, however, been widely criticized for giving priority to private 
patent holders over public health.171 
 
The core inquiry in this chapter is the impact of the TRIPs Agreement on the access to 
affordable pharmaceuticals in developing countries. One third of the world’s population 
does not have regular access to affordable medicines, and 95% of people with HIV/AIDS 
do not have access to antiretroviral treatment.172 Further, infectious diseases kill more than 
10 million people each year, 90 percent of whom are living in developing countries.173 
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There are a variety of obstacles to providing the population in developing countries with 
essential medicines: Logistical supply and storage problems, substandard drug quality, 
inappropriate selection of drugs, wasteful prescription and inappropriate use, inadequate 
production, prohibitive prices and lack of financing for health care.174 In many cases, 
however, prohibitive prices is the main barrier.175 There are two main methods in the 
TRIPs Agreement for dealing with the health crisis in poor countries: Compulsory 
licencing and parallel imports. Both methods enable lower prices on pharmaceuticals, and 
may hence increase access. 
 
“Generic drugs” or “generics” are terms used for copies of patented drugs, which are often 
sold at a lower price under the name of the chemical ingredient of the drug.176 Under a 
compulsory license, a country may on certain conditions produce a generic version of 
patented drug to supply the domestic market, i.e. an exception from the patent right. 
However, many developing countries do not have technology or size of market to 
manufacture affordable generic versions.177 They are hence dependent on importing generic 
versions. 
  
The impact of generic competition on the price of first-line AIDS triple therapy has been 
documented by Médecins Sans Frontières. When the patent-protection expired in 2000, 
generic competition lowered the prices substantially. The original price was $10439 
annually. After less than four years of generic competition, the price on the originator was 
$562, while some generic copies were down to $168. This clearly illustrates the impact of 
patent protection on pharmaceutical prices.178 
 
Drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis, malaria and pneumonia are spreading, and the 
resistance entails a great need for new medicines.179  
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One of the core demands of developing countries, health agencies and NGO’s in the Doha 
Round of negotiations has been to open for such export in order to make generic drugs 
accessible and affordable in developing countries.180 These demands were largely agreed 
upon in the Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health in 2001.181  
 
First, TRIPs provisions on patent protection will be accounted for. Further, exceptions from 
the protection requirements that could provide for cheaper medicines will be discussed. 
Finally, recent developments regarding these provisions will be addressed. 
 
 
2.2 TRIPs and Patent Protection on Pharmaceuticals 
In the following analysis of the rules on patent protection, it is important to bear in mind 
that the scope of options within a particular country not only can be limited by the WTO 
framework, but also might be - and often is, subject to further restrictions by bilateral and 
regional trade agreements, but not least national legislation. The TRIPs Agreement only 
sets out minimum standards that the members have to comply with. Each member can 
determine the level of protection within these boundaries, and can hence establish a 
stronger protection of patents. For members to use the exception-mechanisms provided for 
in the TRIPs Agreement, they also have to be provided for in national law. 
 
2.2.1 Deadlines for Implementation of TRIPs Obligations 
In accordance with Article 65 (1) of the TRIPs Agreement, developed country members 
shall comply with the obligations of the agreement by 1996. For developing country 
members, the agreement goes into effect in 2000 [Article 65 (2)], but with an additional 
period of five years on areas for which countries that had not granted patents when the 
TRIPs Agreement entered into force in 1995 [Article 65 (4)]. LDCs had initially until 2006 
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to comply [Article 66 (1)], but the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health paragraph 
7 extended the transition period for enforcement of pharmaceutical patents until 2016. 
LDCs were also given a general extension of the transition period under Article 66 (1) from 
2005 until July 1, 2013.182 All member countries except LDCs shall now hence be TRIPs 
compliant.  
 
2.2.2 TRIPs Provisions on Patent Protection  
The TRIPs Agreement Articles 27-34 contains the provisions on patent protection. Article 
27 (1) provides that patents shall be available for any inventions, including both products 
and processes. It is hence not only the pharmaceuticals themselves that can be subject to 
protection, but production processes may also be. The minimum period of patent protection 
is twenty years [Article 33].  
 
Member countries are required to respect foreign patents filed in their country, and can 
hence not produce generic versions without using the mechanisms provided for in TRIPs. 
The so-called mailbox rule in Article 70 (8) provides interim legal procedures for receiving 
post 1995 patent applications during the period of transition. When full implementation of 
TRIPs obligations is achieved in accordance with the transition deadlines described above, 
patents are back-dated to the date of filing, providing protection for the invention in the 
remainder of the patent period. 
 
Inherent to patent rights is the granting of exclusive rights for the patent holder. The 
exclusive rights are outlined in Article 28, and require patent holders to be given legal 
powers to prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing a 
protected invention without the right-holders consent. 
 
However, these rights are not absolute. A number of exceptions to the exclusive rights are 
provided for in the TRIPs Agreement. Articles 27 (2) and (3) provide exceptions for certain 
inventions in which the members may exclude from patent protection. Articles 27 (2) 
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provides that “[m]embers may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within 
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public 
… including to protect human… health…, provided that such exclusion is not made merely 
because the exploitation is prohibited by their law”. Note that the term “may” allows but 
does not mandate such exceptions. “Ordre public” is a term derived from French law, and 
relates to matters that threaten the structure of the civil society.183 This paragraph may be 
interpreted as a general public health exception. It is, however, interpreted narrowly. It 
applies to inventions that themselves are harmful to ordre public,184 which might e.g. be a 
patent for an invention whose purpose is illegal activities. 
 
Another exception that might seem to provide a limitation on the scope of the patent 
protection that could be used for public health purposes is Article 30. Three cumulative 
conditions must be met to qualify: (1) the exception must be “limited”, (2) the exception 
must not “unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent”, and (3) the 
exception must not “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, 
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties”. In WTO disputes, the provision 
has been interpreted stringently. In Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents,185 Article 30 was 
found to permit governments to allow research on patented pharmaceuticals, and 
manufacturers of generics to produce a patented drug to obtain regulatory approval in order 
to introduce their generic version on the market as soon as the patent has expired – the so-
called “regulatory review exception”. Otherwise, the protection would de facto be more 
than the fixed period of patent protection, as the stringent requirements for regulatory 
approval of new pharmaceuticals would lead to a significant delay of the introduction of 
generics in the market.  
 
Production of the patented drug to stockpile it for sale in the post-expiry market, the so-
called “stockpiling exception” in the Canadian Patent Act, was however not found to 
conform to Article 30. This was due to the term “limited exceptions” in Article 30. The 
term “exceptions” implies derogation from the main rule, which by nature is limited. The 
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panel stated that “[t]he term ‘limited exceptions’ must therefore be read to connote a 
narrow exception – on which makes only a small diminution of the rights in question.”186 
The stockpiling exception that was provided for in the Canadian Patent Act was not found 
to be a limited exception, as it “constitutes a substantial curtailment of the exclusionary 
rights” provided for in Article 28 (1) of the TRIPs Agreement. Generic manufacturers will 
hence not be able to enter the market on the day of the patent-expiry because they first have 
to manufacture a sufficient stock of goods.  
 
In conclusion, Article 30 does not, in light of the Canada – Pharmaceuticals Patents case, 
seem to have a sufficient scope to cover exceptions that could make possible generic 
production in the protection period in order to make affordable drugs available in 
developing countries. The precedent of the case does not control future panels (see 
paragraph 6 of the introduction). Although not very likely, Article 30 of the TRIPs 
Agreement, in light of the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health, could be 
interpreted differently in future cases. 
 
2.2.3 Compulsory Licencing 
Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement confines the extent to which the members may 
authorize use of patented inventions without authorization of the right holder. It is an 
exception from the rights of the patent-holder provided for in Article 28, and allows 
compulsory licencing and government use of patented pharmaceuticals. Compulsory 
licensing is use of a patent-protected invention on the permission of the government 
“without the authorization of the right holder”. It hence allows manufacturers of generic 
drugs, on specific terms set out in Article 31, to use a patented invention without the patent 
holder’s permission. The domestic laws of the members that allow such use must conform 
to a number of conditions in order to protect the interests of the patent holder. 
 
First of all, the party applying for a compulsory license must have made attempts to obtain 
a voluntary license from the patent-holder on “reasonable commercial terms” over a 
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“reasonable period of time” without success [Article 31 (b)]. In the case of “national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-
commercial use”, however, this requirement may be waived. In the anthrax case in the US 
and Canada in 2001, it was evident that the definition of “national emergency” is very 
unclear.187 
 
In any case, if a compulsory license is issued, the patent holder shall be paid “adequate 
remuneration, taking into account the economic value of the authorization” [Article 31 (h)]. 
Further, the authorization must be considered on an individual basis [Article 31 (a)], the 
license must be non-exclusive; the patent holder can continue its production [Article 31 
(d)], and the scope and duration of such use is limited according to the purpose for which it 
was authorized [Article 31 (c)].  
 
2.2.4 Import under Compulsory Licencing 
Article 31 (f) sets out a limit to the amount of export of drugs manufactured under a 
compulsory license: It must be “predominantly for the supply of the domestic market”. 
Developing countries that are not capable of producing generics or have insufficient 
domestic manufacturing capacities (e.g. due to lack of technical or financial resources), the 
amount that can be imported is effectively confined by the limits that Article 31 (f) place 
on the exporting countries. Recent developments on this issue will be discussed below. 
 
2.2.5 Parallel Import 
A parallel import, also known as “grey product”, refers to a genuine product placed on the 
market in one country, which is subsequently imported into a second country without the 
permission of the owner of the intellectual property rights which attach to the product in the 
second country.188 The price of the drug in the country from which it is imported is lower 
than in the country to which the drug is imported, and the drug can be sold at a lower price 
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than the manufacturers. With this method, developing countries are hence enabled to 
import medicines at the lowest prices available. 
 
Parallel importing is particularly important to countries that do not have manufacturing 
capacity and therefore are not able to use the compulsory license method. In addition to 
lowering the price on patented pharmaceuticals, parallel import allows import of generic 
versions produced under compulsory license in other countries. In other words, compulsory 
licensing and parallel import can be used in combination.  
 
The legal principle of parallel imports is exhaustion of rights, which means that when a 
patented product is sold legally, the patent-holder does not have the right to control further 
sale or exportation of the goods. Article 6 of the TRIPs Agreement confines the legal basis 
on which a dispute can be raised in the matter of exhaustion: None of the provisions of the 
TRIPs Agreement, except those dealing with non-discrimination, namely Articles 3 and 4, 
”shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights“ in a 
WTO dispute. Within these limits, exhaustion of IP rights is hence to be determined by 
each member. However, problems will most likely arise concerning the interpretation of 
the doctrine of exhaustion; whether domestic or international principles of exhaustion are 
to be applied. 
 
The problem regarding Article 31 (f) – “predominately for the domestic market” - also 
applies to parallel import of compulsory licensed goods. For countries with no or 
insufficient manufacturing capacity, both methods provided for in the TRIPs Agreement 
that could be used to deal with the prices on pharmaceuticals are hence limited by this rule. 
 
 
2.3 The Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health 
The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted on the fourth 
Ministerial Conference in Doha on November 14, 2001, is an authoritative interpretation of 
the TRIPs Agreement in accordance with Article IV (2) of the WTO Agreement. The 
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declaration was stated to be a historic achievement.189 Paragraph 4 states that the TRIPs 
Agreement “does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect 
public health ..., in particular, to promote access to medicines for all”. The declaration 
hence aims to provide flexibility for such purposes in the interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  
 
Specific interpretive flexibilities are provided for in Article 5 of the declaration. First, it is 
emphasized that the object and purpose of the TRIPs Agreement shall be guiding in 
interpretive issues [Article 5 (a)]. This is a well known principle in treaty interpretation, 
and is provided for in Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.190 
However, read in the light of paragraph 4, it incorporates public health considerations into 
the object and purpose of the agreement, thereby establishing a more dynamic 
interpretation to stress public health considerations, setting out an interpretive baseline of 
the TRIPs Agreement in public health issues. 
 
Further, particular interpretive issues regarding public health are provided for: “Each 
Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the 
grounds upon which such licences are granted [Article 5 (b)]. The members can hence 
choose the grounds upon which compulsory licences shall be issued; it is a matter of 
national discretion. 
 
Article 5 (c) clarifies the exception in Article 31 (b) of the TRIPs Agreement on “national 
emergencies and other situations of extreme urgency”, which permits members to waive 
the requirement of negotiations with the patent-holder on a voluntary licence before a 
compulsory license may be issued. It does not only include emergencies where time is 
crucial, but also long-lasting health emergencies that ravage several developing countries: 
“Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including 
those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a 
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national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency”. However, the freedom to 
determine what constitutes a national emergency is effectively confined by the TRIPs 
Agreement Article 31 (b), because a “national emergency” is a specific example of 
“circumstances of extreme urgency”. The national emergency definition must therefore 
satisfy the “extreme urgency” requirement. The “right” provided in Article 5 (c) of the 
Declaration is hence of limited significance. 
 
Paragraph 5 (d) of the Declaration provides that “each Member [is] free to establish its own 
regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment 
provisions of Articles 3 and 4”. The members can determine that the patent-holders right 
shall be exhausted after the first sale, but such a practice must be exercised non-
discriminatory: the domestic regime determining exhaustion of intellectual property rights 
cannot discriminate between local and foreign patent holders. Article 6 of the TRIPs 
Agreement shall hence not an obstacle to parallel import of pharmaceuticals. 
 
2.3.1 The Legal Status of the Declaration 
The Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health191 is a so-called authoritative 
interpretation. According to the WTO Agreement Article IX (2), the Ministerial 
Conference and the General Council have exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of 
WTO Agreements. Ministerial declarations are, however, not legally binding.  
 
It might be argued that for the interpretive authority delegated to the Ministerial 
Conference in accordance with Article IX (2) of the WTO Agreement to be efficient, such 
interpretive decisions should have legal force. The principle of sovereignty in international 
law, however, effectively limits the ways by which states can accept obligations.  
 
The clarity of the provisions is also of significance. Ambiguity opens for a variety of 
interpretive approaches, and would weaken the persuasive authority of the declaration. 
They would hence be volunerable to narrowing interpretations.  
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The Doha Declaration constitutes softlaw with substantial authority. It builds political 
pressure on the members to comply, but that is also how far it goes. Powerful nations can 
resist such pressures, which they will when the opposing interests are sufficiently strong. 
The US Trade Representative’s fact sheet refers to the Declaration on TRIPs and Public 
Health as a political declaration, and in accordance with the “spirit” of the declaration, it is 
interpreted as covering pandemics.192  
 
In case of contradiction with rules “expressly recognized by the parties”, the declaration 
would probably be interpreted narrowly or set aside/suspended. However, the declaration 
does not have any visual contradictions. Ministerial Declarations do not have legal 
relevance in terms of a legal source that panels and the Appellate Body are legally 
obligated to consider. However, they can and should be considered. The Doha Declaration 
has great persuasive authority in the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement in the event of 
a dispute.  
 
2.3.2 Implications of the Declaration 
The declaration fails to clarify key terms such as “public health”, and although the 
members can decide what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency, the scope of the declaration is largely left open for narrowing 
interpretations that could limit many of the commitments made. As described below, fierce 
opposition from developed countries with economic interests in pharmaceutical companies 
such as the US, Canada, Switzerland and Japan, has subsequently led to several attempts of 
backtracking on the Doha promises.  
 
Although Article 31 allows members to issue compulsory licences to third parties, the so-
called paragraph 6 issue remains unsolved. This despite the great political willingness 
demonstrated in the declaration; it illustrates how controversial the compulsory license 
issue is, in particular the ability to import medicines produced under compulsory licences. 
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Developed countries and the pharmaceutical companies fear reduced profits if generics 
produced under compulsory license could be imported by all countries with insufficient 
manufacturing capacity. The main worry is that generics might be diverted to countries 
where the patent is protected, and thereby undermine the mechanisms ensuring restitution 
of R&D investments, and, of course, profits. 
 
Article 6 of the declaration, however, provides that the countries lacking manufacturing 
capacities “could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licencing under 
the TRIPs Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to 
this problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002”. As Article 6 
carefully insinuates, many developing countries will not be able to take advantage of the 
compulsory license method without a solution to the Article 31 (f) problem, as they cannot 
issue licences to manufacturers based in other countries, nor import from other members.  
 
Finally, Article 7 instructs the TRIPs Council193 to grant LDC’s an extended deadline for 
implementation and application of Sections 5 and 7 of the TRIPs Agreement with respect 
to pharmaceuticals, namely “Patents” and “Protection of Undisclosed Information”, until 
January 1, 2016. This was set out by decision of the TRIPs Council of June 27, 2002.194 
 
Although the declaration is not legally binding, it provides an interpretive baseline for the 
conflicting interests in the TRIPs Agreement, namely those of the patent-holder (R&D 
incentives) and the public health crisis. Even though it does not control the interpretation of 
the TRIPs Agreement, it might be an element in the interpretation that could provide for a 
more fair determination of the contesting interests. If the members choose to accommodate 
the public health issues provided for in the declaration in future cases and commitments 
within the area, the declaration could lay the ground for a fairer and more defined legal 
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framework, ensuring poor countries the right to attend to their public health issues in an 
effective and predictable manner.  
 
 
2.4 The Paragraph 6 Issue 
As provided for in Article 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health, the 
TRIPs Council was instructed to find an “expeditious solution” to the issue regarding 
countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities to be able to use the compulsory 
licencing exception effectively. Thereof called the paragraph 6 issue. The deadline set out 
in paragraph 6 was the end of 2002.  
 
A block of developing country governments proposed to grant developing countries the 
same rights to affordable medicines as developed countries, because countries with no or 
insufficient manufacturing capacity cannot produce generic medicines at all or only in a 
limited scale, and import is largely confined by Article 31 f. 195 This constitutes a double 
standard between rich and poor countries with regard to access to medicines. They hence 
recommended lifting the restrictions on export of generic medicines through an 
authoritative interpretation196 of Article 30 of the TRIPs Agreement.197  
 
Article 30 allows limited exceptions from the exclusive patents, and the recommendation 
proposed that the exception is written into national law so that the generic producers could 
respond to requests or compulsory license from an importing country.198 According to the 
proposition, the authoritative interpretation should not be restricted to particular diseases or 
countries. This was backed by the WHO and most developing countries, in particular the 
African Group consisting of all African member-countries. The same approach was 
recommended by the European Parliament as amendment to the EU Medicines Act.199 
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A counter-offensive was initialized by large pharmaceutical companies and their 
governments, wanting a temporary waiver to be restricted to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and 
similar epidemics, and only applied to truly disadvantaged countries, such as in Sub-
Saharan Africa.200 
 
The Article 30 approach was rejected by the EU and US. The US wanted a waiver for 
disputes involving compulsory licensing for export. Temporary, legal uncertainty. EU: 
amendment to TRIPs, exception to compulsory licencing restrictions on export for 
pharmaceuticals. But the legal mechanism demanded compulsory licences to be issued in 
both the exporting and the importing country. The importers would be dependant on the 
political will in the countries with generic exporters – administrative burden and wouldn’t 
provide necessary economic incentives and uncertainty for the generic manufacturers. In 
addition, these proposals included many new safeguards to remedy the fear of diversion of 
generic exports to developed country markets. Industrial concerns. They also advocated 
restrictions to particular diseases and countries, which would result in limited coverage.  
 
2.4.1 The 2002 Deadlock 
During the negotiations on the paragraph 6 issue, several attempts were made to curtail 
developing countries’ access to generics, reneging the commitments of the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health. Largely, the attempts where made or supported by 
countries hosting large pharmaceutical companies, including the US, EU, Canada, 
Switzerland and Japan. For instance, the scope was limited by setting a list of diseases 
covered, most for which patents are not a barrier: For most of the covered diseases there 
was either no treatment or the patent-protection of the treatment had expired.201 In other 
words, compulsory licencing would be applicable only for a limited number of the diseases 
covered. 
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On December 16, 2002, the Chairman of the TRIPs Council submitted a proposal for an 
interim solution to the paragraph 6 issue, the “Motta text”.202 The proposal allowed export 
of generics to developing countries, but the conditions on manufacturing capacity were 
ambiguous, which implies a lack of predictability of future interpretation on such a 
controversial issue. E.g. each country had to “establish” that it does not have sufficient 
manufacturing capacity [paragraph 2 (a)(ii)], and the exporting member could manufacture 
“only the amount necessary to meet the needs” of the importing country. It further required 
both the importing and the exporting country to issue compulsory licences. The proposal 
did, however, not restrict the scope of diseases covered. 
 
The US blocked adoption of the proposal due to the scope of diseases,203 insisting on 
limitations to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other infectious epidemics. On December 20, the 
US trade representative Robert Zoellick stated that such a focus on infectious diseases 
would reflect the original intentions of the Doha Declaration.204 The US made a last minute 
attempt to limit the range of medicines by inserting a footnote,205 but this was rejected by 
most developing countries. The representative of Kenya speaking on behalf of the African 
Group stated that the proposed footnote would be “redefining and limiting the scope of 
public health problems”.206  
 
The 16 December deadline passed in deadlock, with the US alone vetoing the proposed 
solution. The US was subsequently alleged of being controlled by its powerful 
pharmaceutical lobby and unreasonable fear of cheap generics being diverted to rich 
country markets. In an open letter to the WTO delegates, CPTech, Oxfam, MSF and HAI 
urged them to reject the “Motta text”, concluding that “the 6 December 2002 Motta text 
would allow countries to export some medicines to least developed countries, and to a very 
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small number of developing countries that meet the severe test set out in the proposed 
Annex on manufacturing capacity”.207  
  
2.4.2 The Interim Waiver 
In early 2003, new initiatives for a compromise were launched by the EU, Japan and TRIPs 
Council Chairman, trying to get the US onboard.208 These were rejected by developing 
countries due to further limitations such as a fixed list of diseases, limits on eligible 
countries, and restriction to emergency situations.209 The Chairman launched a “statement 
of understandings” on February 5, 2003,  in a new attempt to get the 16 December “Motta 
text” adopted. 210 According to the “understanding”, the solution would be limited to 
"national emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency”. Oxfam urged 
developing countries not to accept this solution, as “poor countries should not have to wait 
until a health problem has reached emergency proportions before being able to obtain 
affordable generic medicines”.211  
 
The General Council reached a decision212 on the issue, accompanied by a statement of the 
Chairman,213 on August 30, 2003, less than two weeks before the Cancun Ministerial 
Conference. The decision attempts to remove limitations on exports under compulsory 
licenses to countries without sufficient manufacturing capacities. There are no restrictions 
to emergencies or circumstances of extreme urgency, or to specific diseases or countries. 
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As discussed above, this was in accordance with the core demands of the developing 
countries. 
 
The decision is an interim waiver based on the Motta proposal,214 and remains in force until 
the TRIPs Agreement is amended [Article 11]. It is a waiver to the Article 31 (f) restriction, 
and allows members, on certain conditions, to export generic medicines made under 
compulsory licenses. All countries are eligible under the waiver [Article 1 (b)], but 23 
developed countries have voluntarily announced that they will not use the system [note 3 to 
the decision], and 12 other countries have announced that they would only use it in 
emergencies.215  
 
The waiver outlines requirements for both the exporting and the importing country. It 
allows countries producing generic copies of patented pharmaceutical products under 
compulsory licences to export the products to “eligible importing Members” [Article 2]. 
Definition of “eligible importing Member” is provided for in Article 1 (b): The term 
applies to “any least-developed country Member”, and “any other Member that has made a 
notification to the Council for TRIPS of its intention to use the system as an importer”. The 
notification requirement does hence not apply to LDC members, and notifications from 
other members do not have to be approved by the WTO [note 2]. Note that paragraph 2 sets 
out that Article 31 (f) of the TRIPs Agreement may only be waived “to the extent 
necessary”. 
 
As commented above, the member must have “established that it has insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in question” 
[paragraphs 2 (a)(i) and (ii)], and if the pharmaceutical is patented in its territory, it must 
have granted or intend to grant a compulsory license [paragraph 2 (a)(3)]. The importing 
member must further notify the Council of the name and expected quantity of the 
pharmaceutical(s) needed. Only the quantity notified to the Council may be manufactured 
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by the exporting country, and the total production shall be exported to the notifying 
member(s) [paragraph 2 (b)(1)].  
 
Finally, the eligible importing member shall take “reasonable measures” to prevent re-
exportation [paragraph 4]. Developing- and least-developed country members may, 
however, according to the same paragraph, request assistance through technical and 
financial assistance from developed country members to facilitate the implementation of 
this provision. 
 
The waiver outlines requirements for the exporting country to prevent diversion to 
developed country markets. As discussed above, diversion was one of the key worries of 
several developed countries in the negotiations. Firstly, products “shall be clearly identified 
as being produced under the system”, e.g. through specific labeling or marking [paragraph 
2 (b)(ii)]. The exporting member shall notify the Council for TRIPs of compulsory licences 
granted under the system, and their conditions [paragraph 2 (c)]. The manufacturer must 
post on a website the quantities of export to each destination, and the “distinguishing 
features” of the products required by paragraph 2 (b)(ii) [paragraph 2 (b)(3)]. The exporting 
country must also pay compensation to the patent holder for the use of its patent [paragraph 
3]. 
 
Finally, in accordance with paragraph 5, all members shall “ensure the availability of 
effective legal means” to prevent importation, sale and diversion of products produced 
under the system that are inconsistent with the provisions of the Declaration. 
 
The statement of the General Council Chair, Carlos Perez del Castillo, which was attached 
to the Decision, is “designed to provide comfort to those who feared that the decision might 
be abused and undermine patent protection”.216 The statement elaborates on some shared 
understandings of the members regarding interpretation and implementation of the 
Decision. Among others, it notes that the system established by the Decision shall be used 
“in good faith to protect public health”, and that “all reasonable measures should be taken” 
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to prevent diversion for which they are not intended. The legal relevance of the statement is 
limited, and may primarily serve as an interpretive guideline. Its limited significance was 
also mentioned introductory by the Chairman. 
 
A focal point regarding the practical implications of the Decision is how “insufficient” 
manufacturing capacity will be interpreted. The definitions in paragraph 1 elaborates on the 
meaning of “pharmaceutical product”, “eligible importing Member”, and “exporting 
Member”, but the term “insufficient”, which is crucial to determine the scope of the waiver, 
is not defined. The ambiguity that the lack of this definition entails makes the scope of the 
Declaration vulnerable to narrowing interpretations. The controversial nature of the issue 
was probably prohibitive on this point. 
 
A number of countries will need to adopt legal frameworks to make use of the decision. 
LDCs will, however, not be affected by the Decision until after their implementation 
deadline in 2016.  
 
2.4.3 The Amendment of the TRIPs Agreement 
A decision on amendment of Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement was made on 6 December 
2005,217 making the 2003 interim waiver permanent. It was the first time a core WTO 
agreement had been amended. The Protocol is open for acceptance until December 1, 2007, 
with possibilities for extensions if necessary.218 In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 
X of the WTO Agreement, the amendment enters into force for the member who has 
accepted it upon acceptance by two-thirds of the members. Until now, three countries have 
accepted the amendment, namely the US, Switzerland, and El Salvador.219 The interim 
waiver from 2003 remains in force until then. For the remaining third that has not accepted 
the amendment when it enters into force, the 2003 waiver remains in force until 
acceptance. 
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The decision “directly transforms the 30 August 2003 ‘waiver’ into a permanent 
amendment” of the TRIPs Agreement, and is designed to match the 2003 Waiver as closely 
as possible.220 This is to ensure that the “legal meaning and weight, and the hierarchy of 
provisions, are preserved as exactly as possible”, in order to avoid departing 
interpretations.221Also the procedures are matched, including statement by the General 
Council chairperson.222  
 
The new Article 31 “bis” (additional article after Article 31) and its annex will be attached 
to the TRIPS Agreement when the protocol of amendment enters into force. An appendix 
to the Annex assesses how lack of manufacturing capacity in the importing country can be 
established. As discussed above, this was one of the shortcomings of the 2003 waiver. The 
appendix provides that LDCs are “deemed to have insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities”. Other members must either establish that it (1) has no manufacturing capacities 
in the pharmaceutical sector; or (2) where the member has some capacity (excluding the 
capacity of or controlled by the patent holder), has examined this capacity and found it 
“insufficient for the purposes of meeting its needs”. Graduation appears when it is 
established that this is no longer the case. This appendix will be important to LDCs when 
they are to be TRIPs compliant in the pharmaceutical sector in 2016. It may seem like 
establishing insufficient manufacturing capacity for other members is on their own 
discretion. Other members may, however, in accordance with the Chairman's statement, 
challenge the establishment of insufficient capacity, as any member may bring “any matter 
related to the interpretation or implementation of the amendment … to the TRIPS Council 
for expeditious review” [third section of the statement]. The statement requires 
notifications to outline how insufficient or no manufacturing capacity have been 
established. This is allegedly to avoid controversy.  
 
The administrative burden on the TRIPs Council set out through the amendment is 
substantial. How the TRIPs Council will handle such requests is indeed of great importance 
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to the scope of the amendment, as the ambiguity of the manufacturing capacity rules 
probably will spur many conflicts on the interpretation.  
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Without patent protection on medical discoveries, incentives to develop new medicines for 
pharmaceutical companies would largely disappear. R&D activities would then largely 
depend on public funding. Harmonized intellectual property regulation through the TRIPs 
Agreement ensures a high level of R&D activities, removes obstacles to trade, and 
facilitates competition. The compromise between private interests and public health when 
deciding on the appropriate level of protection in the TRIPs Agreement should particularly 
focus on the impact on developing countries. Private actors must have adequate economic 
incentives to develop new medicines. This is particularly important to developing 
countries, as the development of resistant types of prevalent diseases has proliferated in the 
last years, partly due to a proliferation in the counterfeit market.223  
 
However, dissenting interests must also be given weight when the level of IP protection 
shall be determined. Public health and biodiversity considerations should not be 
outweighed by the need for rapid technological advance and protection of business 
interests. The patent regime set out in the TRIPs Agreement provides an effective global 
monopoly for inventions by setting the minimum of protection period to 20 years and 
enabling filing of patents in all member countries. Compulsory licencing does hence play a 
vital role both as a negotiating tool to lower the prices on patented drugs produced by the 
patent owner (e.g. the US - Anthrax case), and to allow generic production and import in 
the patent period to make sufficient amounts of medicines available in national health 
emergencies and long-lasting epidemics. 
 
The political willingness early in the Doha Round was substantial, and the declaration can 
largely be seen as an expression of that. Subsequently, several countries attempted to 
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renege the commitments made. This is an illustration of the problematic nature of such 
political declarations; the beneficiaries are depending on the good will of other members 
when the commitments are to be actualized. However, if such declarations were legally 
binding, the members would be very careful with making promises, but they would at least 
have more than persuasive authority.   
 
The current solution to the paragraph 6 issue set out in the 2005 amendment, requires 
notifications, establishing insufficient manufacturing capacities, measures against 
diversion, granting compulsory licences in both the importing and the exporting country, 
and payment of compensation to the right-holder. This makes the system quite an 
administrative burden. Futhermore, the current solution cannot be used to promote long-
term public health policies. Stockpiling of medicines for future use is not allowed; only 
real-time public health protection is hence provided for. This is in contradiction with the 
intentions and flexibilities that were provided for in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs 
Agreement and Public Health, as the TRIPs Agreement “does not and should not prevent 
Members from taking measures to protect public health”. Competition in the generic 
manufacturing market is neither addressed in the decision. There is hence a need for a more 
substantial reform of the TRIPs Agreement than the 2005 amendment. 
 
Two approaches could be used to provide TRIPs flexibility to meet public health needs:  
(1) Maximum use of current public health safeguards and promotion of generic 
competition, as provided for in the Doha Declaration. This would, however, not remedy the 
systematic problems of the TRIPs agreement, as the TRIPs Agreement sets a floor, not a 
ceiling on IP protection. The increased public awareness on these issues over the last six 
years has not led to sufficient reforms.  
(2) Reform TRIPs ground rules by providing greater flexibility in the period of patent 
protection, e.g. through geographical restrictions on patent protection (Lanjouw, 2002). The 
problem with this approach is that it is not likely to be politically feasible, the continuing 
reluctance until now considered. 
The current health crisis in the developing world will not be solved by more flexible rules 
of IP protection, facilitation of generic import and competition in generic manufacturing, 
but it would be a vital and necessary contribution to this process.  
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Conclusion 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the WTO procedures, rules and agreements cannot only 
be adapted to the needs of disadvantaged members. Small and poor countries will always 
be vulnerable and face disadvantages in interaction with large and wealthy nations. 
Developed countries account for some 70 percent of the trade within the WTO.224 Their 
active participation in the WTO is imperative, also for the benefits of developing countries 
from participation in multilateral trade. This could be jeopardized if developing countries 
could outvote them in important matters, resulting in a further pursuit of bilateral and 
regional arrangements, in which developing countries would find themselves even more ill-
equipped for participation as well as for influencing agreements and dispute settlement. 
 
The legal framework of the WTO governing Ministerial Conferences has several 
democratic features, including the consensus principle, equal voting rights, transparency, 
participation, etc. However, these principles are general; their specific content is not 
elaborated upon in the legal framework of the WTO. This decreases the likeliness of the 
principles being followed in the practice of the Organization, as was illustrated in the 
preparatory processes of the Cancun Ministerial Conference.225  
 
The WTO regulatory framework fails to set out rules and guidelines governing the political 
processes of the WTO that ensures predictability, transparency and overall fair outcomes. 
Ad hoc procedures improvised by powerful nations, and procedures adhered from the 
GATT largely lay the ground for large developed countries to shape procedures to their 
advantage. Thereof their resistance to the introduction of rules and guidelines.  
 
The standard operating rules and practices and the lack of those, reflect and exacerbate the 
power inequalities within the membership of the WTO. Absence of accurate and invariable 
rules and procedures applied to the various processes in negotiations and decision-making 
makes room for improvisation in advantage of the powerful nations. The flexible feature of 
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WTO negotiations entails a significant lack of predictability to its members. The final 
agreements often contain ambiguous language that makes future interpretations and the 
actual scope of their commitments less predictable.  
 
The negotiation and decision-making structures are not adapted to the increasing 
membership with its vastly different levels of development, as well as the scope and 
complexity of the issues covered. Because of flexible and informal structures, it does not 
ensure that no member has a fundamental objection on an issue when the decision is made. 
It is hence not the model itself but the way in which it is practiced in negotiations that 
constitutes a problem and makes many developing countries marginalized in the WTO. 
This exacerbation of power-imbalances should be corrected through establishment of 
precise and invariable rules. This could strengthen the political process, creating a balance 
between the dispute settlement procedure and the law-making of the WTO.  
 
Efficiency and democratic legitimacy are indeed opposing considerations in any legal 
system. If the consensus principle was practiced in a more rule-based fashion, the 
democratic legitimacy of the WTO could increase, but the efficiency would probably be 
curtailed. Similarly, through extensive use of Green Room consultations and flexible 
procedures, the efficiency of WTO processes is increased, while the democratic legitimacy 
is decreased. As mentioned before, there is a growing need for international law-making 
due to the increase of international trade. Efficiency is therefore imperative if the WTO is 
to sustain its position as the main international institution governing multilateral trade, and 
for multilateral trade to be preferential to bilateral and regional arrangements, particularly 
in relation to major traders. The democratic features are on the other hand imperative for 
the ability of underdeveloped countries and emerging economies to attain continued 
development. Striking the appropriate balance could meet the needs of both, and strengthen 
the WTO and its multilateral approach. 
 
There will always be imbalances in power relations in international institutions. However, 
the extents to which these imbalances are reflected in the proceedings and outcome of 
negotiations largely depend on how the processes for interaction are governed in its rules 
and practices. However, when this process is exercised among unequal parties of largely 
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different power and means of negotiation, it facilitates the ability of powerful countries to 
force small and poor countries to accept compromises that they otherwise would not have. 
This can be done by threats of withdrawing existing benefits such as financial assistance 
and aid, or offering bilateral carrots. Such consultations alleviate the process of reaching an 
agreement, but often at the cost of the interests of developing countries. The main point is 
to facilitate a negotiation process among unequal parties that attempts to balance the 
asymmetry rather than exacerbate it. 
 
Participation in resource-intensive agreements, in particular those imposing “behind the 
border” regulatory policies, should be subject to cost-benefit analysis with regard to 
countries with a low level of development. Such agreements can to some countries threaten 
the overall beneficial effect of their participation in the WTO. The potential benefits of 
being party to an agreement should be weighed against the costs of implementation and 
adaption. 
 
The consensus process of the WTO is characterized by informal and partly excluding 
consultations of which transparency and predictability is largely disregarded. This may 
exacerbate the conditions of the poor countries’ participation and influence in negotiations. 
Poor countries face impaired bargaining skills due to lack of participation caused by both 
resource-shortages and non-invitation to key negotiations. Further, the consensus model 
entail erosion of multilateralism follows the lacking efficiency and democratic abilities of 
the negotiation-structures. The imbalance between the judicial dispute settlement system 
and the flexible political processes of the WTO creates a lack of predictability. 
 
The WTO membership should adopt a range of formal procedures ensuring an inclusive 
approach, enhancing the transparency and predictability of the WTOs law-making and 
decision-making processes. Formal rules could also facilitate the consensus process by 
preventing situations as was witnessed on the Cancun Ministerial Conference. Formal rules 
would give developing countries a greater say in the rule-making processes, and would 
hence enable greater benefits for developing countries from multilateral trade. Setting out 
such measures are, however, dependant on the support of major traders.  
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